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List of Parties in this Case 
There are no other parties beyond those given in the foregoing caption in 
this case. For the sake of clarity, the parties are, at times, referred to herein as 
follows: 
1. Utah State Tax Commission, Petitioner in the trial court, Appellee in the 
Utah Court of Appeals, is at times referred to herein as "Commission" 
or "Tax Commission." 
2. H. Douglas Goff and Lisa Goff, Respondents in the trial court, 
Appellants in the Utah Court of Appeals, are at times referred to herein 
as "Mr. Goff with respect to H. Douglas Goff, "Mrs. Goff with 
respect to Lisa Goff, and "Goffs" when reference is to both Mr. Goff 
and Mrs. Goff. 
3. The Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah is, 
at times, referred to herein as the "trial court" or "district court." 
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Statement of Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is derived pursuant to a WRIT 
OF MANDATE AND JUDGMENT issued by the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, 
Third District Court Judge, Salt Lake County on September 21, 2004 and entered 
that same day. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3 (2) (j). 
1 
Statement of the Issues 
The issues of this appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the Commission acted within its statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations of its statutory right when there is no evidence on the 
record that the Goffs are taxpayers as the term is used Utah Code, Ann. (U.C.A.) 
section 59-1-707? The trial court's final order is reviewed for correctness, 
granting no deference to the district court's ruling. U.C.A. § 59-1-707, . Radinsky 
v. U.S., 622 F.Supp. 412, 413, 56 A.F.T.R.2d 85-6157, 86-1 USTC P 9161 at 413 
(U.S.D.C, D.Colo. 1985); Girard Trust Bank v. United States, 226 Ct.Cl. 366, 643 
F.2d 725, 47 A.F.T.R.2d 81-1607, 81-1 USTC P 13,394 (Ct. CI. 1981); In Re 
Western Trading Co, 340 F.Supp. 1130 at 1133 (U.S.D.C, D. Nevada 1972); 
Estate of Goetzv. United States, 286 F.Supp. 128 (U.S.D.C.,W.D. Missouri 1968); 
Brafman v. United States, 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1967). This issue was preserved 
at trial. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 4, lines 15-20. 
2. Whether the trial court denied the Goffs their rights to administrative due 
process of law by accepting jurisdiction in this case, when the question of whether 
the Goffs are persons required to file Utah income tax returns was already before 
the Commission, pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, as a part of 
a request for agency action, and the Commission has yet to act on that request for 
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agency action?1 The trial court's final order is reviewed for correctness, granting 
no deference to the its ruling. See U.C.A. § 63-46b-l et seq., Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Board of Regents of 
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548; Grannis v. 
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914), Armstrong v. 
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). This issue was 
preserved at Trial. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 90, lines 15 - 24, p. 114,1. 12 
through p. 116,1.24. 
3. Whether the district court erred when it overruled the Goffs' objections 
to the entering of Tax Commission Records as evidence of either 1) gross income 
as it is defined by 26 U.S.C. § 61, or 2) any other income of a character or nature 
that would fall within the confines of Title 26, subtitle A, U.S.C. A. when the 
witnesses who testified about the records admit that they do not have first hand 
knowledge of the truth of the matters contained in those records and those records 
are based on unverified hearsay within hearsay. The trial court's final order is 
reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the its ruling. Utah Rules of 
In its memorandum Decision in this case, dated January 6, 2005, the Utah Court 
of Appeals summarily affirmed the trial court's order as to the issue of whether the 
Commission is required to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Goffs have 
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for its Writ of Certiorari (case number 
20050103-SC) to review the record on that issue and other questions. The issue 
presented in "b." above, necessarily includes a discussion of a requirement to 
exhaust administrative remedies in order to fully examine the due process 
question. The Goffs reserve the right to expand their argument of this issue should 
the Utah Supreme Court grant certiorari and reverse and remand on the question of 
whether the Commission was required to exhaust administrative remedies. 
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Evidence, Rules 801, 802, 803, 805; U.S. v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, (1st Cir. 1999); 
Alexander v. CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 867, 880 
(N.D. 111. 2002); Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930); J.S.v. 
State, 939 P.2d 196, at 201 (C.A. Utah 1997), Cf. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 
at 1071 (Utah 1993). This issue was preserved at trial. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 
298, p.33, line 13 - p. 37, line 17. See also, p. 50, line 15 and p. 56, line 10 and p. 
73,1. 12-24. 
4. Whether the district court erred in overruling the Goffs' objection to the 
entry into evidence of certain of the Commission's records (Exhibit P-l) and 
records of the Utah Department of Workforce Services ("DWS") (Exhibit P-5), 
when the records contain unverified double hearsay and all witnesses testifying 
about the records admitted that they could not testify to the truth of the matters 
contained in the records? The trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, 
granting no deference to its ruling. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805; U.S. v. 
Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, (1st Cir. 1999); Alexander v. CIT Technology Financing 
Services, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 867, 880 (N.D. 111. 2002); Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 
124, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930); JS v. State, 939 P.2d 196, at 201 (C.A. Utah 
1997), Cf. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, at 1071 (Utah 1993). This issue was 
preserved at trial. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p.33, line 13 - p. 37, line 17. See 
also, p. 50, line 15 and p. 56, line 10 and p. 73,1. 12 - 24. 
5. Whether the district court erred in ruling that exhibit D-6 which was 
entered into evidence, would support a holding that the Goffs received income 
4 
sufficient to require them to file tax returns, when the exhibit was not offered as 
evidence of the truth of the matters contained therein and contains only hearsay 
within hearsay to the issue of income? The trial court's ruling is reviewed for 
correctness, granting no deference to its ruling. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 
805; U.S. v. Vigneau, 187F.3d70, (1st Cir. 1999); Alexander v. CIT Technology 
Financing Services, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 867, 880 (N.D. 111. 2002); Johnson v. 
Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y.1930); J.S v. State, 939 P.2d 196, at 201 
(C.A. Utah 1997), Cf. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, at 1071 (Utah 1993); 
Murray v. United States, 10 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1926). This issue was 
preserved at trial. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298 at pages 121-122. 
6. Whether the district court erred in ruling that appellant Lisa Goff waived 
her right to not be compelled to give evidence against herself in her testimony, 
when the District Court did not advise her of this right prior to her testimony 
pertaining to income? The trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness, granting 
no deference to its ruling. Utah Constitution, Article I, section 12; United States 
Constitution, Amendment V; United States Constitution, Amendment XIV; Brady 
v. U S., 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). This issue speaks 
directly to the trial court's abridgement of Ms. Goff s constitutionally protected 
right against self-incrimination. Mr. Goff objected to the questions at trial. See 
Transcript at pages 19-20. 
7. Whether the district court erred in sustaining the Commission's objection 
to the admission of Exhibit D-7, the Goffs' Notice, Access and Evidentiary 
5 
Hearing Request dated April 22, 2004, when Exhibit D-7 is the document which 
the Goffs used to initiate their request for agency action pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedures Act (U.C.A. § 63-46b-l et seq.)? The trial court's 
ruling is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to its ruling. Utah Rules 
of Evidence, Rule 402. This issue was preserved at trial. See TRIAL RECORD, 
P. 298 at p. 92, lines 18-24. 
Should the Court find that certain of the above issues were not preserved at 
trial, the Goffs pray for the Court's forgiveness and request the Court consider the 
issues as it has done in the past. See Jensen v. State Tax Com'n, 835 P.2d 965, 
"Questions not raised in an administrative tribunal are generally not subject to 
judicial review . . . we occasionally will depart from strict application of this rule 
for pro se litigants . . . " citation omitted. 
6 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Rules and Regulations 
Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central importance to this appeal 
are set out verbatim in Addendum 1 hereto. The brief contains the citations either 
within the text or footnoted to the text. The Appellants rely on the provisions set 
forth in the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24 (a) (6) and Rule 24 (a) 
(11) as well as the language in the Court's Order dated April 6, 2005. 
7 
Statement of the Case 
On April 22, 2004, the Goffs mailed their letter captioned NOTICE, 
ACCESS and EVIDENTIARY HEARING REQUEST to Ms. Brenda Salter, an 
auditor employed by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission.2 
The Goffs letter sought the Commission's answers to questions about how Utah's 
tax laws and federal tax laws impacted the Goffs.3 With their letter, the Goffs 
submitted their affidavits which outlined all facts they believe relevant to 
determining what impact the state and federal income tax laws would have on 
them.4 
While waiting for a response to their letter, the Goffs were served with a 
verified petition for writ of mandate and judgment against Lisa Goff5 which the 
Commission filed with the trial court June 2, 2004.6 Sometime later, the Goffs 
learned that the Commission filed a second verified petition for writ of mandate 
and judgment against H. Douglas Goff that had yet to be served. Mr. Goff 
accepted service in the trial court July 12, 2004 at which time the trial court 
ordered consolidation of the two cases into one. 
2
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 26-100, See also, Exhibit D-7. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Id. 
5
 See TRIAL RECORD, p. 1-7. 
6
 Id. 
7
 See TRIAL RECORD, p. 130-131. 
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August 16, 2004, the trail court held a hearing on the merits and found for 
the Commission8 and held that the Goffs are required to file Utah individual 
income tax returns for the years 1996 through 2002 (excluding 1999 with respect 
to Mr. Goff).9 The trial court entered its final order titled Writ of Mandate and 
Judgment which ordered the Goffs to file state income tax returns for the years at 
issue and pay the Commission's attorney fees and costs.10 The Goffs appealed 
from the trial court's final order in its entirety,11 and the Commission motioned for 
summary disposition based on the issues set forth in the Goffs' docketing 
statement.12 
After receiving the Commission's motion, the Goffs' response in 
opposition thereto and the Commission's request to submit for decision, the Utah 
Court of Appeals ("Court of Appeals") summarily affirmed the trial court's final 
order as to two issues, namely, 1) that the Commission was not required to exhaust 
administrative remedies in this case prior to petitioning the trial court for writs of 
mandate, and 2) that the Commission presented sufficient evidence regarding the 
federal tax structure and definitions that would determine whether the Goffs are 
required to file federal income tax returns which would invoke the Utah statute 
requiring the filing of Utah income tax returns.13 
8
 See TRIAL RECORD, Pp. 263-266,298.. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. 
11
 See TRIAL RECORD, p, 269-271. 
See Docketing Statement, Motion for Summary Disposition. 
13
 See Memorandum Decision, p. 3, third para.. See also U.C.A. § 59-10-502. 
9 
The Court of Appeals denied the Commission's motion for summary 
disposition on the evidentiary issue of the Goffs' income where the documents the 
Commission introduced as evidence of the Goffs' income for the years at issue 
were based on unsworn statements of third parties and on unsworn statements of 
other parties yet further removed from the documents that the Commission 
introduced into evidence.14 The trial court overruled the Goffs' objections 15 to 
said documents being received into evidence.16 The Court of Appeals found that 
the Goffs have identified a substantial issue and decided to allow briefing on that 
issue to continue.17 The Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision of January 6, 
2005 is silent as to the other issues raised in the Goffs Docketing Statement and 
the Commission's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
On February 7, 2005, the Goffs filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari to 
the Court of Appeals as to those issues where the trial court's order was summarily 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Memorandum Decision entered January 6, 
2005.18 The Utah Supreme Court has since denied the Goffs Motion for Writ of 
Certiorari filed February 7, 2005.. 
15
 The grounds for the Goffs' objection is that the documents contain unverified 
hearsay within hearsay to the truth of the matters contained with the documents. 
16
 See TRIAL RECORD, p. 298, p. 33,1. 13 thru p. 34,1. 12 and p. 73,1. 12 thru 1. 
24. 
17
 See Addendum 6 hereto (Memorandum Decision), p. 3. 
18
 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, case no. 20050103-SC. 
10 
Summary of Argument 
The Utah State Tax Commission is granted authority from the Utah 
Legislature to oversee the taxing laws of the State of Utah.19 The Legislature has 
based the state's individual income tax on the federal income tax system. 
Therefore, a person whose income, the State of Utah seeks to tax must first fall 
within the confines of the federal taxing laws, because " 'state taxable income' in 
the case of a resident individual means his federal taxable income . . ." with certain 
91 
modifications and adjustments. The problem with the Commission's case in this 
matter is that they have failed to show that 1) the Goffs income, if any, falls with 
the federal taxing statutes, 2) the tax imposed by Title 26, Subtitle A of the United 
States Code has general applicability within the states of the Union, (i.e., are laws 
of the United States and not mere Acts of Congpess), and 3) the Goffs status, 
individually or as marriage partners, is that of a "taxpayer." The foregoing are 
elements that must be proved before the provisions found in U.C.A. § 59-1-707 
may be brought to bear on the Goffs. 
Even if the Goffs had accepted taxpayer status, the problems with the 
Commission's case are evidentiary ones. First is a lack of evidence of the federal 
laws themselves (both statutory and administrative). The Commission only 
addressed the federal statutes that may impose a requirement to file federal income 
19
 See U.C.A. §59-1-210(5). 
20
 See U.C.A. § 59-10-102 et seq. 
21
 See U.C.A. §59-10-112. 
11 
tax returns on the Goffs. What was lacking was the evidence that they do impose 
such a requirement. Without a federal taxing statute that imposes the federal 
income tax on the Goffs in evidence on the record of this case, there is no 
requirement to file. Absent a federal requirement for the Goffs to file income tax 
returns, there is no requirement for them to file state income tax returns.23 
Therefore, the trial court's final order is not grounded in the requirements of the 
law. Second, the Commission's evidence of income in this case is fraught with 
evidentiary problems in that all the evidence of income that is on the record was 
objected to as not meeting the requirements for exception to the hearsay rule.24 
The exhibits the Commission introduced are documents that contain hearsay 
within hearsay and are therefore inadmissible because they do not meet the criteria 
of Rule 805, in that the Commission is not the maker of the records, but adopted 
the records of the IRS who adopted the records of others, none of which were 
transferred under seal or by affidavit to the Commission. 
There are additional issues of the trampling of the Goffs' constitutionally 
protected rights of due process of law and the bar against self-incrimination. The 
Commission has no authority to petition the trial court for its writ of mandate 
22
 See 26 U.S.C. §6012. 
23
 See U.C.A. §59-10-502 
24
 See Utah Rules of Evidence, Rules 801, 802, 803, 805. 
25
 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805. Hearsay within hearsay. Hearsay included 
within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined 
statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules. 
12 
unless the party they seek to compel is a taxpayer. The status of "taxpayer" has 
not been proven as it may or may not apply to the Goffs in this matter. Absent 
proof of taxpayer status, the Goffs reject the notion that they are taxpayers. 
Additionally, Ms. Goff was not advised of her constitutional right to not 
incriminate herself before she testified in this matter. While it may not be the 
usual practice for the court to Mirandize29 a witness before giving testimony, it 
should have been done in this case, because Ms. Goff was an opposing party in 
this case, was not represented by an attorney, did not have enjoy the benefit of 
assistance of counsel, and it was foreseeable that her testimony as to matters of 
income, if given, could be used against her in criminal actions that may grow out 
of this case. Any testimony given by Ms. Goff relating to income before she 
learned of her right to not give testimony that could forseeably be used against her 
in the future should have been stricken. 
For any one of more of the foregoing reasons, the Writ of Mandate and 
Judgment of the trial court should be vacated, or at a minimum, reversed. 
zo
 See U.C.A. §59-1-707. 
27
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298 at p.4 1. 15 - 25. 
28
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298 at p. 18 1. 20 - p. 19 1. 22. 
Mirandize means to advise one of their constitutionally protected rights before 
eliciting statements from them. From the landmark Supreme Court decision in 
Miranda v. Arizona. 
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Argument 
I. The Commission acted outside of its statutorily authorized 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, when there is no evidence on the 
record that the Goffs are or were taxpayers as the term is used in 
U.C.A. § 59-1-707. 
Title 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (a) (14) defines the term "taxpayer" as ". . . any 
person subject to any internal revenue tax." U.C.A. § 59-10-103 (1) (w) defines, 
for the purposes of that chapter, the term "taxpayer" as ". . . any individual, estate, 
or trust or beneficiary of an estate or trust, whose income is subject in whole or 
part to the tax imposed by this chapter." 
Prior to filing its Verified Petitions for Writ of Mandate, the Commission 
received from the Goffs a request for agency action, wherein the Goffs asked for a 
determination grounded in findings of fact and conclusions of law whether the 
Goffs possess the status of "taxpayers." The Goffs raised the issue in their 
motion to dismiss that was filed in the court on June 25, 2004. At the hearings 
held on August 16, 2004, the Goffs reiterated that the issue of whether the Goffs 
are taxpayers has not been affirmatively established in a record either before the 
trial court or elsewhere.32 The Commission has acquiesced to the Goffs position, 
JU
 See Exhibit D-7. 
31
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 22 - 100. at p. 22 - 24. 
32
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298 at p. 4,1. 15 - 20. 
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because they have remained silent to the Goffs' assertion of lack of taxpayer status 
and the time to speak up as to that issue was at trial — if not before. 
The record shows the Commission's silence as to the Goffs' inquiry. From 
Brenda Salter's testimony at pp. 89-94, beginning at page 89, line 4: 
Q. BY MR. GOFF: Is one of your duties to respond to the questions 
that people ask about their tax status? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Back in April did you receive a letter from my wife and I — or my 
wife and me titled a notice access and evidentiary hearing request? 
A. I did. 
Q. The subpoena you were served told you to bring that letter with you. 
Do you have the letter? 
A. I have a copy of it. 
[At this point, there was a discussion with the court about Exhibit D-7 which is the 
Goffs' request for agency action. The discussion pertained to, among other things, 
the relevance of Exhibit D-7. Continuing from the record: 
THE COURT: You can make your argument as you want. 
Ms. Salter, you may have received this. Did you ever answer it? 
THE WITNESS: I did not. 
THE COURT: You did not. Okay. So that was what you wanted. She 
didn=t answer it. So there - what your position is that without her answering it 
33
 Id. See also, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 (d). 
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there is no findings or conclusions, using your words, to indicate that you=re liable 
in any way, correct? Is that your position? And then you can argue that. 
MR. GOFF: I=d like to proffer it into evidence, too. 
THE COURT: You=ve proffered it. I=m not receiving it. D-7 is not 
received as being irrelevant here. You can argue it at the end of the case, Mr. 
Goff, and I understand what your argument is. You=ve said it a number of times, 
and I=m not that dense that it doesn=t get it, but you can argue it at the correct 
time. 
MR. GOFF: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Any other questions of Ms. Salter, other than 
for the use of D-7? 
Q. BY MR. GOFF: Ms. Salter, why did you not answer our request -
our April 22nd letter? 
A. I discussed it with my manager and he had already answered the 
questions — most of the questions - well, the questions in that. 
Q. Okay. Who is your manager? 
A. Danny. 
THE COURT: Mr. Engh? 
Q. BY MR. GOFF: Mr. Engh felt that you had - that the -- the 
questions raised herein were already answered? 
A. Were answered sufficiently, yes. 
Q. In what form? 
16 
A. He wrote a letter to you. I witnessed the letter that he gave - sent to 
you. 
Q. He=s reference - he=s referencing a letter - he was referencing a 
letter sent to -- in March of this year? 
A. To -- I=m not sure of the date. 
MR. GOFF: Okay. Your Honor, that letter is not in evidence or hasn=t 
been -- it hasn=t been presented to the Court. 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. GOFF: Okay. 
THE COURT: But her testimony is in. 
[END QUOTATION OF TRANSCRIPT] 
Utah law specifically states that, "An income tax return with respect to the 
tax imposed by this chapter shall be filed by: (1) every resident individual, estate, 
or trust required to file a federal income tax return for the taxable year . . ,"34 
(emphasis added..) 
Utah's "writ of mandate" statute states: 
"If a taxpayer fails to file any return required pursuant to Title 59 within 60 
days of the time prescribed, the commission may petition for a writ of 
mandate to compel the taxpayer to file the return. The petition may be 
filed, in the discretion of the commission, in the Tax Division of the Third 
Judicial District or in the district court for the county in which the taxpayer 
resides or has his principal place of business. In the case of a nonresident 
taxpayer the petition shall be filed in the Third District Court."35 emphasis 
added. 
See U.C.A. §59-10-502(1). 
See U.C.A. § 59-1-707(1) (a). 
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The writ of mandate statute is a remedy the Commission may use to 
enforce compliance against taxpayers and not against any other class.36 There is 
no evidence on the record that the Goffs are taxpayers as the term is used in the 
internal revenue laws of the United States or as the term is used in U.C.A. §59-1-
707. In fact, the record says that such a determination of the Goffs' status never 
took place.37 
Daniel Engh, a Commission Audit Manager responsible for determining 
taxpayer status, testifies at p. 108 of the transcript as follows: 
Q. Was there any efforts made to determine whether we [the Goffs] are 
persons that fall within the confines of subtitle (a) that determine— 
A. Probably. 
Q. But you - can you recall specifically? 
A. No. 
Q. You are the individual - you are the person charged with making 
those types of determinations? 
A. Along with the auditors, yes. 
MR. GOFF: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Engh. 
[END QUOTATION OF TRANSCRIPT] 
Id. See also, Radinsky infra. 
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p.76,1. 24 - p. 77,1. 6. 
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Absent the Goffs acceptance of the taxpayer "hat," a finding by the 
Commission that they are taxpayers as the term is used in U.C.A. § 59-1-707 is a 
required element to invoke the provisions of that statute, because the statute, as it 
states, applies to taxpayers and not to all persons. By remaining silent to the Goffs 
charge that attempts have been made to cast them as taxpayers when that is not a 
fact affirmatively established in a record [of any proceedings of which the Goffs 
are aware],39 it is incumbent on the Commission to either prove the contrary or 
accept the Goffs' position. The Commission failed to show that the Goffs are 
taxpayers and, arguably, accepts the Goffs' position that they are nontaxpayers. 
The authority the Commission cites for bringing this action against the 
Goffs, U.C.A." § 59-1-707, is clear that it is a remedy available to the Commission 
to apply against "taxpayers." At trial, the Commission presented no testimony or 
evidence that proves the Goffs are "taxpayers" as the term is used in U.C.A. § 59-
1-707. In fact, the Commission's audit manager, Mr. Engh, testified that the 
Commission made no determination of the Goffs' status with respect to taxpayer 
status.40 Yet without the Commission establishing the district court's subject 
matter jurisdiction, the district court took jurisdiction in this case as evidenced by 
In his dissent from the majority opinion in Economy Plumbing & Heating Co., 
infra, Judge Nichols compared taxpayer status with a hat, "I see no reason why a 
claimant may not put on the hat of a taxpayer, or reject it, as he chooses, in a 
situation such as we have here. He can make his choice according to his position." 
39
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 4,1. 15 - 20 and p.89,1. 7 - p. 92,1. 11. 
40
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 76, line 24 - p. 77, line 6. 
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its final order.41 At an earlier opportunity when the Goffs' requested information 
from the Commission, the Commission chose to remain silent when asked whether 
the Goffs are persons required to file returns.42 The Goffs find no statutory basis 
within the writ of mandate statute (U.C.A. § 59-1-707) for the Commission to seek 
what it terms "a permissible remedy" to seek a court order to compel an individual 
who is other than a "taxpayer" to file a return of any type.43 The statute provides a 
remedy for the Commission to seek such writs against taxpayers44 — not against 
individuals who have not been determined to be taxpayers — and the Commission 
has failed to provide any proof through testimony or evidence that the Goffs are 
taxpayers as the term is used in the writ of mandate statute.45 
Furthermore, the Commission, and the trial court for this matter, can not 
continue to treat the Goffs as having a legal position of "taxpayers" in that there is 
no evidence in the record: 
a) that the Goffs are " . . . individual[s], estate[s], or trusts[s] or 
beneficiary[ies] of an estate or trust, whose income is subject in whole or part to 
the tax imposed by [Title 59,] chapter [10 of the Utah Code, Ann.]"46 
41
 See TRIAL RECORD PP. 263 - 268 (Writ of Mandate and Judgment). 
42
 See Exhibit D-7 or Exhibit 1 to Respondents' Petition to Dismiss Verified Writs 
of Mandate. See also transcript from page 89, line 4 through page 92, line 11. 
43
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 89, line 4 and p. 92, line 11. 
44
 The Commission admits that Utah income tax returns are required to be filed by 
taxpayers. See Verified Petitions for Writ of Mandate, p. 3. ^  12. 
45
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 89, line 4 and p. 92, line 1 1 . . 
46
 See U.C.A. § 59-10-103 (1) (w). 
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b) of any procedurally proper, lawful assessment for taxes. Until such time 
that a procedurally proper, lawful assessment is made, the Goffs do not have the 
status of "taxpayer."47 
c) that the Goffs filed a petition in a tax court, therefore acquiescing to or 
assuming the status of "taxpayer." To file a petition in the non-judicial court 
inherently assumes the jurisdiction of the "court" and the legal position of a 
48 
taxpayer. 
Since there is no evidence on the record of the required jurisdictional 
elements that the Goffs are "taxpayers", the Goffs' status is that of nontaxpayers. 
Title 59, U.C.A. and its associated agency, the Utah State Tax Commission have 
no statutory authority over a nontaxpayer.49 Without such evidence on the record, 
the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear the issue because the Commission 
approached the Court with U.C.A. § 59-1-707 as the statute that gives the 
Commission authority to seek a Writ of Mandate, but when challenged as to 
4/
 See. Radinsky v. U.S., 622 F.Supp. 412, 413, 56 A.F.T.R.2d 85-6157, 86-1 
USTC P 9161 at 413 (U.S.D.C, D.Colo. 1985); Girard Trust Bank v. United 
States, 226 Ct.Cl. 366, 643 F.2d 725, 47 A.F.T.R.2d 81-1607, 81-1 USTC P 
13,394 (Ct. CI. 1981); In Re Western Trading Co, 340 F.Supp. 1130 at 1133 
(U.S.D.C, D. Nevada 1972); Estate ofGoetz v. United States, 286 F.Supp. 128 
(U.S.D.C.,W.D. Missouri 1968); Brafman v. United States, 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 
1967). 
48
 See. Lively v. CIR, 705 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir., 1983); Ficalora v. CIR, 751 F.2d 85 
(2nd Cir., 1983); Charczukv. CIR, 111 F.2d471 (10th Cir., 1985). 
49
 See Economy Plumbing & Heating v. U S, 200 Ct. CI. 31, 470 F.2d 585, 589 
(Ct. CI. 1972). 
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whether the Goffs are taxpayers, the Commission was mute, and its employee 
testified that no formal determination of the Goffs status as taxpayers was made.50 
Therefore, the Commission acted outside its statutory grant of authority 
when it filed its Verified Petitions for Writ of Mandate against the Goffs. 
II. The Commission failed to show that the Goffs are persons required 
to file federal income tax returns. Therefore, they can not be compelled 
to file state income tax returns. 
Just as Utah taxpayer status is driven by federal law,31 so is the requirement 
to file a Utah income tax return.52 U.C.A. § 59-10-502 sets forth that the 
requirement for an individual to file a state income tax return is predicated on the 
requirement to file a federal income tax return. Therefore the requirement to file 
a federal return is an element that must be proved for the trial court to issue its writ 
to compel the Goffs to file the Utah income tax returns mandated by the district 
court's writ of mandate and judgment. That requirement, if it exists would be 
found in the body of federal law. 
There is no evidence on the record of a federal statute coupled with a 
substantive implementing regulation that a requirement for the Goffs to file a 
federal income tax return exists.54 The requirement to file a federal income tax 
5U
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 76, line 24 - p. 77, line 6. 
51
 See U.C.A. §§ 59-10-102, 59-10-103 (1) (w), 59-10-112. 
52
 See U.C.A. §59-10-502. 
53
 Id. 
54
 See United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 438, 80 S.Ct. 459, 463-464, 4 
L.Ed.2d 423 (1960). 
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return is an element that must be on the record before the trial court can exercise 
its jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. § 59-1-707. 
The Commission must prove all elements of section 59-1-707 before a Writ 
of Mandate can be issued.55 Absent a federal statute coupled with its substantive 
regulation setting forth a requirement for persons in the Goffs' situation to file 
federal income tax returns, there is no evidence in the record of a requirement 
imposed on the Goffs to file federal income tax returns.56 
Furthermore, there is no evidence on the record of a federal taxing statute 
that would give rise to a requirement to file a federal income tax return.57 Taxing 
statutes must be specific. This requirement is held in United States of America v. 
Community TV, Inc., 327 F.2d 797 (10th Cir., 1964): 
"Without question, a taxing statute must describe with some certainty the 
transaction, service or object to be taxed, and in the typical situation it 
is construed against the Government. Hassett v. Welch, 303 US 303, 58 
S.Ct. 559, 82 L. Ed. 858 (1938)." 
And, in a most recent case of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KUGLIN, 
CASE #: 03-CR-20111-ALL, U.S.D.C. Western District of Tennessee (Memphis) 
55
 See U.C.A. §59-1-707. 
56
 See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208, 19 (1979); 
Mersky, supra. 
57
 See Trial Record, P. 298. 
58
 See United States of America v. Community TV, Inc., 327 F.2d 797 (10th Cir., 
1964). 
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(2003), The Jury found Kuglin not guilty of all charges because no tax liability 
statute was evidenced.59 
Though the courts in Community T. V. or Hassett, supra, did not address 
implementing regulations, an implementing regulation shall be prescribed and 
published in the Federal Register in accordance with the Administrative 
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1) and the Federal Registry Act, 44 U.S.C. § 
1501 et seq., before enforcement of Title 26 U.S.C. can have the force and effect 
of law upon persons proved to come within the statutory authority of the Treasury 
Department. See United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 80 S.Ct. 459, 4 L.Ed.2d 
423 (1960), stating that any claim absent these regulations does not have the force 
and effect of law. See, also, California Bankers Association v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 
21, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974); US v. Murphy, 809 F.2d 1427 at 1430 
(9th Cir. 1987): U.S. v. Reines, 794 F.2d 506 at 508 (9th Cir. 1986). 
In particular, The Supreme Court in Mersky, supra, at 463, articulates that 
statute and implementing regulation must operate together before there is any 
force of law: 
"Once promulgated, these regulations, called for by the statute itself, have 
the force of law, and violations therefore incur criminal prosecutions, just 
as if all the details had been incorporated into the congressional language. 
The result is that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete 
without the other, and only together do they have any force." 
Both 26 U.S.C. § 7805 and its implementing regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 
301.7805-1, clearly state that prescribed rules and regulations are required for the 
59
 See Addendum 4 hereto. 
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enforcement of Title 26 U.S.C.. From the authorities of the courts presented in 
Mersky, California Bankers Association, Murphy, Reines, Community TV, and 
Hassett, the United States Codes 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1), 26 U.S.C. § 7805, 44 
U.S.C. § 1501 et seq., and Code of Federal Regulations, 26 CFR § 301.7805-1, a 
judicial tribunal cannot enforce taxpayer obligations absent a proper statutory and 
evidentiary showing. The lack of evidence on the record of the required elements, 
i.e., a statute coupled with substantive implementing regulation evidencing that the 
Goffs are now or ever were subject to a tax equates to an improper foundation of 
law necessary for the trial court to enforce its order upon Goffs. 
A. The Commission failed to put a federal taxing statute into evidence that 
places a tax on the Goffs' income. Without a taxing statute in evidence, there 
can be no requirement to file returns. Without a requirement to file returns, 
the trial court's order amounts to a denial of the Goffs' constitutionally 
protected right to due process of law. 
The legal responsibility for a tax must be made by statute. It is a violation 
of due process of law,60 if one has to guess what law makes him liable for a tax. 
"(A) statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so 
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at it's 
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due 
process of law." Connally v General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 
46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). 
Here we are not addressing a vague statute, but rather, that there is no 
taxing statute or liability statute coupled with implementing regulations included 
in the evidence, crucial elements that are required to be evidenced on the record 
60
 See United States Constitution, Amendment V. 
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before the Writ of Mandate can be imposed. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 
(a) (1) requires the ".. .pleading . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; ..." Notification of legal 
responsibility is "the first essential of due process of law." Connally, supra. There 
is no evidence on the record of any Notification of a lawfully and legally imposed 
responsibility established under statutory authority alleged in the VERIFIED 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE AND JUDGMENT.61 
The United States Supreme Court addresses the issue of lack of a statute 
averring a lawful and legal liability in Smith v. U.S., 360 U.S. 1, 79 S.Ct. 991, 3 
L.Ed.2d 1041 (1959). The court held that the constitutional right to an indictment, 
as restated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(a), could not be waived by the 
defendant and that a proceeding in violation of this constitutional requirement 
negated the jurisdiction of the court. The constitutional right to be left alone 
unless charged with violating a law, i.e., one charging failure to file a tax return, 
(the essence of due process) is no less a constitutional right than being indicted for 
an infamous crime. In reversing a conviction, the United States Supreme Court 
stated in Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478 (1974). 
"It is beyond question, of course, that a conviction based on a record 
lacking any relevant evidence as to a crucial element of the offense charged 
violates due process." 
See TRIAL RECORD, pp. 1-7. 
26 
In Cole v Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201, 79 S.Ct. 991, 3 L.Ed.2d 1041 
(1947), The Supreme Court again reversed a conviction of a crime that was not 
charged in the indictment. 
"No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than 
that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the 
issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights 
of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal. If, 
as the State Supreme Court held, petitioners were charged with a violation 
of §1 [and convicted of §2], it is doubtful both that the information fairly 
informed them of that charge and that they sought to defend themselves 
against such a charge; it is certain that they were not tried for or found 
guilty of it. It is as much a violation of due process to send an accused to 
prison following conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as it 
would be to convict him upon a charge that was never made." citations 
omitted. 
The Goffs must be given adequate notice of the duties charged against them 
and for which they are to be tried. Smith v. Of Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 61 S.Ct. 572, 
85 L.Ed. 859 (1941) and, "Conviction upon a charge not made would be sheer 
denial of due process." DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362, 57 S.Ct. 255, 259, 
81 L.Ed. 278 (1937). The Commission's silence with respect to the Goffs' request 
for agency action has denied the Goffs the opportunity, available to all other 
persons, to receive assistance in determining the applicability of the taxing laws to 
them in their situation — both state and federal because the state income taxing 
laws are founded on the federal ones. In Boyd v. US, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 
29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), the court observed the succinct statement by Lord Camden: 
"If it is law, it will be found in our books; if it is not to be found there, it is not 
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law." Except as provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the 
burden of proof. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 (d) & (e). 
B. Without the Goffs wearing the taxpayer "hat," the Commission lacks 
standing to petition the trial court for its writ of mandate. 
Since the Commission provided no evidence on the record of the required 
elements establishing that the Goffs are "taxpayers," the Commission did not show 
that it has standing to sue since 1) Section 59-1-707 is a remedy available to the 
Commission against taxpayers and not against other persons, and 2) there is no 
evidence on the record of an "injury in fact," a jurisdictional element required in 
establishing standing to sue. Supreme Court Justice Thomas summarized for the 
Court teachings about standing of a long line of cases as follows: 
"A party seeking to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction must demonstrate 
three things: (1) 'injury in fact,' by which we mean an invasion of a legally 
protested interest that is '(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural of hypothetical' ... (2) a causal relationship 
between the injury and the challenged conduct, by which we mean that the 
injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,' and 
has not resulted 'from the independent action of some third party not before 
the court' ... (3) a likelihood that the injury will be reduced by a favorable 
decision by which we mean that the 'prospect of obtaining relief from the 
injury as a result of a favorable ruling' is not 'too speculative' ... These 
elements are the 'irreducible minimum' ... required by the Constitution." 
62
 Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. 
Jacksonville, 508 US 656, S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). See also, 
ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 109 S.Ct. 2037, 104 L.Ed.2d 696 (1989); 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 
351(1992) 
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The above cases contain criminal and civil cases that speak to the issue of injury-
in-fact being required to invoke the court's jurisdiction. 
Because the Commission did not evidence on the record any of the 
foregoing required jurisdictional elements, the trial court does not have 
jurisdiction to determine whether there is a federal question pursuant to the United 
States Constitution Article I § 8 cl. 3. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). After extensively surveying the history 
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court identified three broad categories of 
activity that Congress may regulate: 1) "the channels of interstate commerce;" 2) 
"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities;" and 
3) "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce." 
Supreme Court Justice Thomas in the concurring majority opinion in the 
case of Lopez, supra, states very clearly: 
"Indeed, on this crucial point, the majority and Justice Breyer [the Justice 
writing the dissenting opinion] agree in principle: the Federal Government 
has nothing approaching a police power." (pg. 64.) 
Then Justice Thomas went on to discuss "a regulation of police" (pg. 86), 
wherein he stated: 
"United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. 41, 9 Wall 4, 19 L. Ed. 593 (1870), 
marked the first time the court struck down as exceeding the power 
conveyed by the commerce clause. In a Two-page opinion, the court 
invalidated a nation-wide law prohibiting all sales of naphtha, and 
illuminating oils. In so doing, the court remarked that commerce clause has 
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always been understood as limited by its terms; and as virtual denial of any 
power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the separate 
States." 
The Commission did not establish jurisdictional elements on the record that 
give the federal taxing statutes applicability to the Goffs under the authority of the 
United States Constitution, Article I § 8 els. 17, 18. Special provision is made in 
the Constitution for the cession of jurisdiction from the states over places where 
the federal government shall establish forts or other military works. It is only in 
these places or in territories of the United States, where it can exercise a general 
jurisdiction. New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 10 Pet. 662, 9 L.Ed. 573 
(1836). "All legislation is prima facie territorial," American Banana Co. v. United 
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29 S.Ct. 511, 53 L.Ed. 826 (1909). "The canon of 
legislative construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a 
contrary intent appears is meant to apply only to the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States." Foley Brothers v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 
680 (1949); U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 222, 70 S.Ct. 10, 94 L.Ed. 3 (1949). 
"The United States has no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal 
jurisdiction, sovereignty or eminent domain, within the limits of state or 
elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted . . . " Pollard v. 
Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223, 3 How. 212, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845), "...the states are 
separate sovereigns with the respect to the federal government..." Heath v. 
Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 106 S.Ct. 433, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985). No sanctions can be 
imposed absent proof of jurisdiction. Stanardv. Olesen, 74 S.Ct. 768 (1954). Once 
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challenged, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, it must be proven to exist. Stuck v. 
Medical Examiners, 94 Ca.2s 751, 211 P2d 389 (1949). See also Maine v. 
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980); Brooks v. Yawkey, 
200 F. 2d 663 (1st Cir. 1953). The law requires proof of jurisdiction to appear on 
the record of the administrative agency and all administrative proceedings. 
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). If the 
tribunal finds absence of proof of jurisdiction over person and subject matter, the 
case must be dismissed. Louisville R. R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 
L.Ed. 126 (1908). Therefore, without evidence of a taxing statute that coupled 
with its substantive regulation evidenced on the record that has general 
applicability within the states of the Union, the trial court can not conclude that the 
Goffs are required to file federal income tax returns and can not compel them to 
file state income tax returns. 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 7 specifies that the "territorial jurisdiction" of the United 
States extends only outside the boundaries of lands belonging to any of the 50 
states, and 40 U.S.C. § 255 specifies the legal conditions that must be fulfilled for 
the United States government to have exclusive, partial, or no jurisdiction within 
the area of lands belonging to the states of the Union. The Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I § 8 cl. 17, operates under 
restrictive terms. To have authority over places purchased from the states for the 
building of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, or any other needful buildings. 
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The Commission fails to establish on the record the required exclusive Federal 
jurisdiction. 
There are no internal revenue districts established in States of the Union, as 
required by 26 U.S.C. § 7621 and Executive Order # 10289, as amended. The 
Internal Revenue Service incursions into States of the Union for purposes 
authorized by 26 U.S.C. Chapter 78 are beyond venue prescribed by law. Title 4 
U.S.C. § 72, concerning the requirement for all departments of the government to 
limit operations to the District of Columbia unless authorized to operate elsewhere 
by statute. See also 40 U.S.C. § 255. The Agency's venue and jurisdiction 
statements are published in 26 C.F.R. § 601.101: 
"Within an internal revenue district the internal revenue laws are 
administered by a district director of internal revenue. "Otherwise, "The 
Director, Foreign Operations District, [now Assistant Commissioner 
(International)] administers the internal revenue laws applicable to 
taxpayers residing or doing business abroad, foreign taxpayers deriving 
income from sources within the United States, and taxpayers who are 
required to withhold tax on certain payments to nonresident aliens and 
foreign corporations..." 
Absent evidence of the required federal jurisdiction, applicability of the 
federal taxing statutes to the Goffs is absent as well. The Goffs, therefore, can not 
have "federal taxable income" as the term is used by U.C.A. §§ 59-10-102 and 59-
10-112. Without evidence of the applicability of the federal taxing statutes to the 
Goffs, the Goffs can not be burdened with being "required to file a federal income 
tax return" as expressed in U.C.A. § 59-10-502. It follows then that the trial court 
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can not compel the filing of state income tax returns due to the provisions of 
U.C.A. § 59-10-502. 
IV. The evidence before the trial court can not be relied on for the truth 
of the matters contained therein and was accepted into evidence over 
the Goffs' objections. 
Information which the Commission characterized as its own business 
records grew out of information transferred from the Internal Revenue Service 
("IRS") to the Commission which were not attested to by anyone from the IRS, 
were not transferred under seal, and which the Commission's keeper of the records 
admits under oath originated from yet other third parties making reports to the 
IRS.63 These records do not conform to Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 80564 
because they are hearsay within hearsay, and the statements contained within the 
Commission records lack the foundation necessary to qualify for an exception to 
the hearsay rule as business records65 or any other exception under Utah R. Evid., 
Rule 803. Nor do the records qualify for exception as public records66 as the 
w
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 38, line 11 - p. 39, line 16. 
64
 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805. Hearsay within hearsay. — Hearsay included 
within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined 
statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules. 
65
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 5, - p. 38, line 2. See also, Utah R. 
Evid., Rule 803 (6), Rule 805. 
66
 Public record - A record that a governmental unit is required by law to keep, 
such as land deeds kept at a county courthouse. Public records are generally open 
to view by the public. (Garner, Bryan A. ed. 1999. Black's Law Dictionary, 
Seventh Edition. St. Paul, Minn. West Group, p. 1279.) 
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Commission argues, because they are not available to the public at large for 
inspection, and the deficiencies with the lack of foundation of the statements 
contained within the Commission records still exist even if they (the Commission 
records) were to qualify as public records. The Commission produced no 
competent witness that was able to testify to the truth of the matters contained 
within the records.69 In Exhibit D-4, a letter to Commission's counsel, Timothy 
A. Bodily, dated August 4, 2004, the Goffs requested the name, address and 
telephone number of the person who has first hand knowledge of the truth of the 
matters contained in the Exhibit D-6.70 Mr. Bodily's response was an affidavit 
signed by Dolores Furniss, a witness at trial.71 On cross-examination, Ms. Furniss 
admitted that she does not have first-hand knowledge as to the truth of the matters 
The public records which set forth the activities of the agency are the 6103 (d) 
agreement (TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 37, lines 9 -15) and the transmittals 
(TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, lines 18 - 19) — not the data itself. See Ut. R. 
Evid., Rule 803 (8). 
68
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 35, lines 17-23. See also, Utah R. Evid., 
Rule 803 (8) 
69
 For Ms. Furniss' admission, see TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 1 - p. 38, 
line 2. For Mr. Engh's admission, see transcript at page 83, lines 12 through 14 
The only other Commission witnesses were the Goffs. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 
298, p. 2. 
70
 See Exhibit D-4, "This is our request for the name and address and telephone 
number of the person who has personal or first-hand knowledge of the truth of the 
matters contained in the attachments to Daniel Engh's affidavit which is Exhibit A 
to the Tax Commission's Response in Opposition to Respondents' Petition to 
Dismiss Petitioner's Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, and Injunctive Relief, 
and Judicial Notice." 
71
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 2. 
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contained within the Commission records.72 Whether the Commission records 
contained in Exhibits P-l and D-6 are business records, public records, both 
business records and public records or neither, those records are founded on 
hearsay statements of the originators of the information which were reported to the 
IRS73 and further hearsay statements of the Internal Revenue Service74 which were 
then in turn reported to the Utah State Tax Commission. Such records are 
therefore unreliable and inadmissible as evidence of anything let alone evidence 
that any payments the Goffs may or may not have received meet a particular 
"threshold income requirement"75 espoused by the Commission. This Court 
established in its holding inJ.S. v. State, 939 P.2d 196, at 201 (C.A. Utah 1997)76 that 
double hearsay may not be the sole basis for disposition in a sentencing 
77 
proceeding. There is arguably a higher standard of proof where a defendant or 
respondent has yet to be judged guilty, or not — liable, or not. In Alexander v. 
CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois ruled regarding Fed. R. Evid. 803 (6) (which the 
72
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 49, line 9, - p. 50, line 14. Exhibit P-l and 
Exhibit D-6 contain for the most part identical records as P-1 except that D-6 does 
not bear a seal and signature of Ms. Furniss. See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 79, 
lines 9 - 14. See also, Exhibits P-l and D-6. 
73 
74 
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 55, line 12-22. 
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 25 - p. 38, line 2. 
75
 See Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805. See also, U.S. v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, 
at75(l s tCir. 1999). 
76
 939 P.2d 196, at 201 (C.A. Utah 1997), Cf. State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, at 
1071 (Utah 1993). 
77
 Id. 
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Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence has adopted ) 
that the business records exception does not extend to unverified statements 
contained within a business record that are made by third parties.79 The United 
States Court of Appeals, First Circuit commenting on Rule 803 (6) in U.S. v. 
Vigneau*0 stated: 
"The classic case is Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 
(N.Y. 1930), which excluded an unredacted police report 
incorporating the statement of a bystander (even though the police 
officer recorded it in the regular course of business) because the 
informant was not part of that business. The Advisory Committee 
Notes to Rule 803(6) cite Johnson v. Lutz and make clear that the 
rule is intended to incorporate its holding." (187 F.3d 70, at 75) 
In this case, the district court relies on Commission records containing unverified 
statements which were forwarded from the Internal Revenue Service, who gleaned 
the information from other parties by way of those parties' reports. l Ms. Furniss' 
testimony is that in neither instance were the records ever verified, transmitted by 
affidavit or under seal attesting to the truth of the matters contained therein.82 The 
only witnesses other than the Goffs that the Commission presented were Ms. 
Fumiss and Daniel Engh, both employed by the Commission and both admitting 
that they have no first hand or personal knowledge of the truth of the matters 
"This rule is the federal rule verbatim. The 2001 amendment adopts changes 
made to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) effective December 1, 2000." (Advisory 
Committee Note to Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence.) 
19
 Alexander v. CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc., 217 F.Supp.2d 867, 880 
(N.D. 111. 2002). 
80
 U.S. v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 70, at 75 (1st Cir. 1999). 
81
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 54, line 18-p . 55, line 11. See also, Id., p. 
38, line 2 2 - p . 39, line 16. 
82
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 1 - p. 38, line 2. 
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contained in the Commission records. Pursuant to Utah R. Evid., Rule 807 the 
Goffs requested identification of the person who could testify to the truth of the 
o r 
matters contained within the Commission's records and the person the 
Commission identified, Dolores Furniss, admits that she 1) did not verify the third 
party statements contained in the Commission records and 2) can not testify to the 
truth of those third party statements contained in the Commission records. 
With respect to Exhibit P-5, similar foundational problems exist. Also, the 
Goffs had no opportunity to confront a witness competent to testify to the truth of 
the matters contained in Exhibit P-5. Like Exhibits P-l and D-6, the statements 
contained within the exhibits did not originate with the Department of Workforce 
Services ("DWS"), but from reports to DWS by businesses or other entities. 
Exhibit P-5 displays no certification from the parties who allegedly reported the 
information to DWS. Therefore, P-5 contains unverified statements by third 
parties. Exhibit P-5 therefore does not conform to Rule 805, Utah Rules of 
Evidence because P-5 contains unverified hearsay within hearsay. 
The Tax Commission introduced two Exhibits, P-l and P-5 at Trial. Each 
exhibit contains unverified hearsay statements from parties other than the 
83
 For Ms. Furniss' admission, see TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 1 - p. 38, 
line 2. For Daniel Engh's admission, see transcript at page 83, lines 12 through 
14. See page 79, lines 9 through 14 for identification of the exhibit discussed as 
Exhibit D-6. 
84
 Formerly Rule 803 (24) prior to November 1, 2004. 
85
 See Exhibit D-4. See also, TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 85, line 4 - p. 86, line 
21. 
86
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 49, line 9 - p. 50, line 14. 
87
 See Exhibit P-5. See also, TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 73, lines 12-23 . 
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Commission. In the case of Exhibit P-l, the lack of verification was present on 
two levels, not verified as to the sources of the information by the IRS and not 
verified by the Tax Commission when received from the IRS.89 Exhibit P-5 
contains two certifications that attest to similar if not identical facts, 1) that the 
documents are copies of DWS's records, 2) that the enclosed records relate to 
reports filed for H. Douglas Goff and Lisa Goff, outlining their social security 
numbers, and 3) that the enclosed documents are true, complete and correct 
copies.90 Both certifications are signed by one Tani Pack Downing.91 Neither 
certification claims that Tani Pack Downing is the custodian of the Department of 
Workforce Service's records. The certifications do not claim that the records are 
business records; nor do they claim the records are public records. The 
certifications do not state the sources of the information presented in the records or 
that DWS had verified the reported information.94 The certifications are silent as 
to whether the DWS records qualify for any exceptions to the hearsay rule under 
Utah R. Evid., Rule 803 or Rule 804.95 Further, the first notice the Goffs were 
given of these records was at Trial. In fact, the notarized certification is dated the 
88
 With respect to P-l, see TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 38, line 11 - p. 39, line 
16. With respect to P-5, see TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 73, lines 12 - 23. See 
also Exhibit P-5. 
89
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 38, line 11 - p. 39, line 16. 
90
 See Exhibit P-5. 
91
 Id. 
92
 Id. 
93
 Id. 
94
 Id. 
95
 Id. 
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day of Trial. The Goffs, therefore, had no opportunity to request identification 
of persons with personal knowledge of the truth of the matters contained in the 
records as they had done with respect to Exhibit D-6.97 The Commission, in 
effect, denied the Goffs any opportunity to confront and question a competent 
witness as to the veracity of any of the Commission records presented in Exhibit 
P-5. 
The Goffs introduced Exhibit D-6 which contains many identical printouts 
of the Commission records in P-l. (P-l contains all printouts contained in D-6 
plus additional documents.) However, D-6 (Affidavit of Daniel Engh) was 
introduced for the purpose of questioning Mr. Engh as to his statements in D-6. It 
QO 
was not introduced as evidence of the truth of the matters contained therein. 
Exhibit D-6 contains printouts of records which are identical to the Commission 
Records represented by several of the printouts in P-l and as discussed earlier 
herein, and therefore is fraught with the same foundational deficiencies with 
regard to Rule 805, Utah Rules of Evidence. In spite of this, the district court 
states, "D-6 is still in evidence, isn't it? I don't care what purpose you used it for. 
Once it's in evidence I can use it for any purpose I want."99 
As discussed earlier, this Court as well as other courts have ruled that 
double hearsay or hearsay within hearsay is inadmissible without each part of the 
See Exhibit D-4 (Letter from the Goffs to Tim Bodily). 
See Murray, infra. 
See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 126, lines 1 -3 . 
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statements qualifying for an exception to the hearsay rule100 because such 
statements taken in their entirety are unreliable. The Court of Appeals, Seventh 
Circuit held, ". . . the fact that they were the quoted statements of others does not 
make them hearsay. Proof of the fact that a certain statement was made is not 
hearsay of that fact. It is hearsay of the truth of the statement."101 
The district court can not rely on Exhibit D-6, as evidence of the truth of 
the matters contained therein and remain consistent with this Court's holdings in 
J.S. and Johnson, supra. 
In summary, there are three exhibits in this case, P-1, P-5 and D-6 that the 
Commission alleges address income. None of these three exhibits can be relied 
on as evidence of the truth of the matters contained therein, because all three of 
these exhibits contain double hearsay and arguably triple hearsay where all parts 
of the combined statements do not conform with any exception to the hearsay rule 
provided in the Utah R. of Evid., Rules 803 or 804. Furthermore, when asked to 
identify the person who has personal or first hand knowledge of the truth of the 
matters contained in the records for which Rule 807, Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides,102 the Commission failed to identify a competent witness. 
V, All evidence admitted and purporting to be evidence of income was 
inadmissible, and with no evidence of income, the trial court's findings 
and final order are unsupported and unjustified. 
100
 See J.S., Alexander, Vigneau, supra. 
101
 Murray v. United States, 10 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1926) 
102
 Formerly Rule 803 (24), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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Without any admissible evidence of gross income as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 
61, the district court is unjustified in its ruling that the Goffs are required to file 
state income tax returns. This lack of evidence alone is enough to justify 
overturning the final order of the district court in this case. 
A. The Evidence Was Improperly Admitted. 
The Commission's case relies chiefly on three pieces of evidence, Exhibits 
P-1, P-5 and D-6, all of which should have been excluded insofar as they are 
admitted to show evidence of income. The Commission's primary piece of 
evidence — Exhibit P-1 — is inadmissible because it lacks the foundation 
required by Utah R. of Evid., Rule 805 The Goffs challenged its admission, 
having exposed that exhibit's deficiencies, and the district court, over the Goffs' 
objection, admitted Exhibit P-1 into evidence. The Commission's allegation that 
the Commission records come in under the business records exception is 
unfounded, because there is no evidence in the Trial Record that any of the 
Commission records were made from information transmitted by a person with 
knowledge. Dolores Furniss did not verify the records received from the IRS104 
and was unable to identify who transmitted the records.105 These foundational 
w
" See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p.33, line 13 - p. 37, line 17. See also, p. 50, 
line 15 - p . 56, line 10. 
104
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 25 - p. 37, line 6. 
105
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 48, line 25 - p.49, line 5. See also, TRIAL 
RECORD, P. 298, p. 36, line 25 - p. 37, line 6. 
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deficiencies in the Commission's records persist under a public records exception 
for which the records arguably do not qualify. 
The records of the Department of Workforce Services (Exhibit P-5) are 
similarly inadmissible as evidence of the truth of the matters contained in them 
because the records' unverified statements by unrelated third parties constitute 
unverified hearsay within hearsay which disqualifies Exhibit P-5 for admissibility 
under Utah R. of Evid., Rule 805.106 This deficiency in P-5 exists even if the 
records themselves qualify as business records or public records under Utah R. of 
Evid., Rule 803.107 Further on the matter of DWS records, the Goffs repeat and 
reallege their arguments in Part IV herein and relate the same argument to Exhibit 
P-5. 
The documents in Exhibit D-6 are copies of the records contained in 
Exhibit P-1. Because such is the case, the Goffs repeat and reallege their 
arguments as they relate to Exhibit P-1 and relate them to Exhibit D-6. Therefore, 
Exhibit D-6 can not be relied on for truth of the matters contained in it. 
B. All of the evidence that speaks to the issue of income was improperly 
admitted and therefore justifies reversal or a decision to vacate the trial 
court's order. 
ALL THREE PIECES of evidence were improperly admitted for purposes 
of ascertaining the truth of the matters contained in them leaving nothing to 
See Footnote 41, supra for text of Rule 805. 
See Utah R. Evid., Rule 805. 
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support the final order of the trial court. In support of this conclusion, the Goffs 
repeat and reallege their arguments in section IV herein. 
VI. The trial court erred in ruling that Mrs Goff waived her right to 
not give testimony against herself. 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Goff were called to testify at the hearing on the merits. 
Mrs. Goff was the first witness called. When on the stand, opposing counsel 
1 08 
questioned her about income figures in exhibit P-l. Mr. Goff objected to the 
fact that the court had not advised a party to the hearing, not represented by 
counsel, who was called by opposing counsel of her basic, constitutionally 
protected rights when he recognized the potential that Mrs. Goffs testimony could 
be used against her at a future, possibly criminal trial.109 The United States 
Supreme Court has held that: 
"Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be 
knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. U. S.9 397 U.S. 742, 90 
S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) 
Immediately upon learning of the "likely consequences" of her testimony, 
Mrs. Goff invoked her right to abstain from self-incrimination and was unavailable 
to testify on matters of her income. 
Mrs. Goffs immediate silence upon becoming aware of the likely 
consequences is the best evidence that 1) she was previously unaware of the 
implications of her testimony, and 2) the wisdom of the holding in Brady. 
108
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 18,1. 20 - p. 19,1. 9. 
109
 See TRIAL RECORD, P. 298, p. 19, lines 17-22. 
43 
Courts ask all the time if a defendant is aware of the implications of their 
actions. They do so for sound reasons and out of respect for the rights of accused 
persons. The fact that it didn't happen here is egregious error. This court should 
order Mrs. Goffs testimony stricken and restore her to her position prior to taking 
the witness chair. 
Conclusion 
The Commission failed to prove that the Goffs are, in their present 
situation, affected by the federal taxing statutes found in Title 26, Subtitle A of the 
United States Code. Without proving that the federal statutes contemplate a tax on 
the Goffs in their situation, the Commission failed to prove that a requirement to 
file federal income tax returns exists, ergo it failed to prove that a requirement 
exists for the Goffs to file state income tax returns. 
The Commission presented documents purporting to evidence the Goffs 
income which the court accepted into evidence over the Goffs objections. Without 
arguing the nature of the matters contained in the documents, all those documents 
are hearsay within hearsay to the truth of the matters contained in them and do not 
comply with Utah R. of Evid., R. 805 to meet an exception to the hearsay rule 
under Rule 803. They are, therefore, inadmissible and the trial court erred when it 
accepted the documents as evidence of the truth of the matters contained in them. 
Therefore, for any one or more of the foregoing reasons, the Court should 
find that error was made in the trial court that has caused the Goffs undue harm, 
44 
and vacate the trial court's final order in this case that was entered September 21, 
2004. 
Prayer 
Hence, for any one or more of the foregoing reasons, the Goffs pray this 
Honorable Court to vacate the Writ of Mandate and Judgment of the trial court 
below and issue its order to the Third District Court to release the bonds or 
deposits in lieu of bond that were made to the court below to bring this appeal if 
vacating the trial court's writ and judgment serves Justice. In the alternative, the 
Goffs pray the judgment and writ of the court below be reversed and remanded to 
the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this Court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY RESUBMITTED this 6th day of June, 2005. 
ro Per 
AM 
Lisa Goff, Appellant Pro Bfef/ 
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Addendum 1 
Verbatim Citations of Statutes and Regulations 
Appellant's Brief Addendum 1 
Addendum 1 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Rules and Regulations 
Constitutional Provisions 
United States Constitution, Article I § 8 cl. 3 
[The Congress shall have power] To regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes; 
United States Constitution, Article I § 8 cl. 17 
[The Congress shall have power] To exercise exclusive legislation in all 
cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as 
may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, 
become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like 
authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the 
state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, 
arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;-And 
United States Constitution, Article I § 8 cl. 18 
[The Congress shall have power] To make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and 
all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United 
States, or in any department or officer thereof. 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual 
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
-1 
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deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, 
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this 
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined 
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
2 
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Statutes 
Federal Statutes 
4 U.S.C. § 72 
Sec. 72. Public offices; at seat of Government 
All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised 
in 
the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise 
expressly provided by law. 
5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (1) 
Sec. 552. Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders, 
records, and proceedings 
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as 
follows: 
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the 
Federal Register for the guidance of the public--
(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the 
established places at which, the employees (and in the case of a 
uniformed service, the members) from whom, and the methods whereby, 
the public may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or 
obtain decisions; 
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its 
functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and 
requirements of all formal and informal procedures available; 
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the 
places at which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the 
scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations; 
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as 
authorized by law, and statements of general policy or 
interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by 
the agency; and 
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing. 
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the 
terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, 
or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the 
Federal Register and not so published. For the purpose of this 
paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class of persons affected 
thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register when incorporated 
by 
reference therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal 
Register. 
~3~ 
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5 U.S.C. §§ 556 (d) & (e) 
Sec. 556. Hearings; presiding employees; powers and duties; 
burden of proof; evidence; record as basis of decision 
(d) Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a 
rule 
or order has the burden of proof. Any oral or documentary evidence may 
be received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the 
exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A 
sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued except on 
consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a 
party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, 
and substantial evidence. The agency may, to the extent consistent with 
the interests of justice and the policy of the underlying statutes 
administered by the agency, consider a violation of section 557(d) of 
this title sufficient grounds for a decision adverse to a party who has 
knowingly committed such violation or knowingly caused such violation 
to 
occur. A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or 
documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such 
cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of 
the facts. In rule making or determining claims for money or benefits 
or 
applications for initial licenses an agency may, when a party will not 
be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or 
part of the evidence in written form. 
(e) The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all 
papers and requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the exclusive 
record for decision in accordance with section 557 of this title and, 
on 
payment of lawfully prescribed costs, shall be made available to the 
parties. When an agency decision rests on official notice of a material 
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, 
on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary. 
18 U.S.C. § 7 
Sec. 7. Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States defined 
The term SNspecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States'1, as used in this title, includes: 
(1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the 
jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in 
whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to 
any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, 
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or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when 
such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of 
the 
United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. 
(2) Any vessel registered, licensed, or enrolled under the laws 
of the United States, and being on a voyage upon the waters of any 
of the Great Lakes, or any of the waters connecting them, or upon 
the Saint Lawrence River where the same constitutes the 
International Boundary Line. 
(3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United 
States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, 
or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States 
by 
consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, 
for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other 
needful building. 
(4) Any island, rock, or key containing deposits of guano, 
which 
may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as 
appertaining to the United States. 
(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United 
States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or 
under the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, 
district, or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight 
over the high seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the 
jurisdiction of any particular State. 
(6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in 
space and on the registry of the United States pursuant to the 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, while that vehicle is in flight, which 
is 
from the moment when all external doors are closed on Earth 
following embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened 
on Earth for disembarkation or in the case of a forced landing, 
until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for 
the 
vehicle and for persons and property aboard. 
(7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with 
respect to an offense by or against a national of the United 
States. 
(8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign 
vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival 
in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or 
against a national of the United States. 
26 U.S.C. § 61 
Sec. 61. Gross income defined 
(a) General definition 
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Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means 
all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) 
the following items: 
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, 
fringe benefits, and similar items; 
(2) Gross income derived from business; 
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property; 
(4) Interest; 
(5) Rents; 
(6) Royalties; 
(7) Dividends; 
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments; 
(9) Annuities; 
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts; 
(11) Pensions; 
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness; 
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income; 
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and 
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust. 
(b) Cross references 
For items specifically included in gross income, see part 
II 
(sec. 71 and following). For items specifically excluded from 
gross income, see part III (sec. 101 and following). 
26 U.S.C. § 6012 
Sec. 6012. Persons required to make returns of income 
(a) General rule 
Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle A shall be made 
by the following: 
(1)(A) Every individual having for the taxable year gross 
income 
which equals or exceeds the exemption amount, except that a return 
shall not be required of an individual--
(i) who is not married (determined by applying section 
7703), is not a surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)), 
is not a head of a household (as defined in section 2 (b)), and 
for the taxable year has gross income of less than the sum of 
the exemption amount plus the basic standard deduction 
applicable to such an individual, 
(ii) who is a head of a household (as so defined) and for 
the taxable year has gross income of less than the sum of the 
exemption amount plus the basic standard deduction applicable 
to 
such an individual, 
(iii) who is a surviving spouse (as so defined) and for the 
taxable year has gross income of less than the sum of the 
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exemption amount plus the basic standard deduction applicable 
to 
such an individual, or 
(iv) who is entitled to make a joint return and whose gross 
income, when combined with the gross income of his spouse, is, 
for the taxable year, less than the sum of twice the exemption 
amount plus the basic standard deduction applicable to a joint 
return, but only if such individual and his spouse, at the 
close 
of the taxable year, had the same household as their home. 
Clause (iv) shall not apply if for the taxable year such spouse 
makes a separate return or any other taxpayer is entitled to an 
exemption for such spouse under section 151 (c) . 
(B) The amount specified in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of 
subparagraph (A) shall be increased by the amount of 1 additional 
standard deduction (within the meaning of section 63(c)(3)) in the 
case of an individual entitled to such deduction by reason of 
section 63(f) (1) (A) (relating to individuals age 65 or more), and 
the amount specified in clause (iv) of subparagraph (A) shall be 
increased by the amount of the additional standard deduction for 
each additional standard deduction to which the individual or his 
spouse is entitled by reason of section 63(f)(1). 
(C) The exception under subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any 
individual--
(i) who is described in section 63(c)(5) and who has--
(I) income (other than earned income) in excess of the 
sum of the amount in effect under section 63(c)(5)(A) plus 
the additional standard deduction (if any) to which the 
individual is entitled, or 
(II) total gross income in excess of the standard 
deduction, or 
(ii) for whom the standard deduction is zero under section 
63(c) (6) . 
(D) For purposes of this subsection--
(i) The terms standard deduction'', x'basic standard 
deduction'' and v'additional standard deduction'' have the 
respective meanings given such terms by section 63 (c) . 
(ii) The term v'exemption amount'' has the meaning given 
such term by section 151(d). In the case of an individual 
described in section 151(d)(2), the exemption amount shall be 
zero. 
(2) Every corporation subject to taxation under subtitle A; 
(3) Every estate the gross income of which for the taxable year 
is $600 or more; 
(4) Every trust having for the taxable year any taxable income, 
or having gross income of $600 or over, regardless of the amount of 
taxable income; 
(5) Every estate or trust of which any beneficiary is a 
nonresident alien; 
(6) Every political organization (within the meaning of section 
527(e) (1)), and every fund treated under section 527(g) as if it 
constituted a political organization, which has political 
organization taxable income (within the meaning of section 
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527(c) (1)) for the taxable year or which has gross receipts of 
$25,000 or more for the taxable year (other than an organization to 
which section 527 applies solely by reason of subsection (f)(1) of 
such section); and \1\ 
\1\ So in original, 
(7) Every homeowners association (within the meaning of section 
528(c)(1)) which has homeowners association taxable income (within 
the meaning of section 528(d)) for the taxable year.\l\ 
(8) Every individual who receives payments during the calendar 
year in which the taxable year begins under section 3507 (relating 
to advance payment of earned income credit).\1\ 
(9) Every estate of an individual under chapter 7 or 11 of 
title 
11 of the United States Code (relating to bankruptcy) the gross 
income of which for the taxable year is not less than the sum of 
the 
exemption amount plus the basic standard deduction under section 
63(c) (2) (D) .\1\ 
except that subject to such conditions, limitations, and exceptions and 
under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary, 
nonresident alien individuals subject to the tax imposed by section 871 
and foreign corporations subject to the tax imposed by section 881 may 
be exempted from the requirement of making returns under this section. 
(b) Returns made by fiduciaries and receivers 
(1) Returns of decedents 
If an individual is deceased, the return of such individual 
required under subsection (a) shall be made by his executor, 
administrator, or other person charged with the property of such 
decedent. 
(2) Persons under a disability 
If an individual is unable to make a return required under 
subsection (a), the return of such individual shall be made by a 
duly authorized agent, his committee, guardian, fiduciary or other 
person charged with the care of the person or property of such 
individual. The preceding sentence shall not apply in the case of a 
receiver appointed by authority of law in possession of only a part 
of the property of an individual. 
(3) Receivers, trustees and assignees for corporations 
In a case where a receiver, trustee in a case under title 11 of 
the United States Code, or assignee, by order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction, by operation of law or otherwise, has 
possession of or holds title to all or substantially all the 
property or business of a corporation, whether or not such property 
or business is being operated, such receiver, trustee, or assignee 
shall make the return of income for such corporation in the same 
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manner and form as corporations are required to make such returns. 
(4) Returns of estates and trusts 
Returns of an estate, a trust, or an estate of an individual 
under chapter 7 or 11 of title 11 of the United States Code shall 
be 
made by the fiduciary thereof. 
(5) Joint fiduciaries 
Under such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe, a return 
made by one of two or more joint fiduciaries shall be sufficient 
compliance with the requirements of this section. A return made 
pursuant to this paragraph shall contain a statement that the 
fiduciary has sufficient knowledge of the affairs of the person for 
whom the return is made to enable him to make the return, and that 
the return is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, true and 
correct. 
(6) IRA share of partnership income 
In the case of a trust which is exempt from taxation under 
section 408(e), for purposes of this section, the trust's 
distributive share of items of gross income and gain of any 
partnership to which subchapter C or D of chapter 63 applies shall 
be treated as equal to the trust's distributive share of the 
taxable 
income of such partnership. 
(c) Certain income earned abroad or from sale of residence 
For purposes of this section, gross income shall be computed 
without 
regard to the exclusion provided for in section 121 (relating to gain 
from sale of principal residence) and without regard to the exclusion 
provided for in section 911 (relating to citizens or residents of the 
United States living abroad). 
(d) Tax-exempt interest required to be shown on return 
Every person required to file a return under this section for the 
taxable year shall include on such return the amount of interest 
received or accrued during the taxable year which is exempt from the 
tax 
imposed by chapter 1. 
(e) Consolidated returns 
For provisions relating to consolidated returns by 
affiliated corporations, see chapter 6. 
26 U.S.C. § 7621 
Sec. 7621. Internal revenue districts 
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(a) Establishment and alteration 
The President shall establish convenient internal revenue districts 
for the purpose of administering the internal revenue laws. The 
President may from time to time alter such districts. 
(b) Boundaries 
For the purpose mentioned in subsection (a), the President may 
subdivide any State, or the District of Columbia, or may unite into one 
district two or more States. 
26 U.S.C. § 7701 (a) (14) 
Sec. 7701. Definitions 
(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly 
expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof--
(14) Taxpayer 
The term ''taxpayer'' means any person subject to any internal 
revenue tax. 
26 U.S.C, § 7805 
Sec. 7805. Rules and regulations 
(a) Authorization 
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any 
person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, 
the 
Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the 
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may 
be 
necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal 
revenue. 
(b) Retroactivity of regulations 
(1) In general 
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no temporary, 
proposed, or final regulation relating to the internal revenue laws 
shall apply to any taxable period ending before the earliest of the 
following dates: 
(A) The date on which such regulation is filed with the 
Federal Register. 
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or 
(B) In the case of any final regulation, the date on which 
any proposed or temporary regulation to which such final 
regulation relates was filed with the Federal Register. 
(C) The date on which any notice substantially describing 
the expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or final 
regulation is issued to the public. 
(2) Exception for promptly issued regulations 
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to regulations filed or issued 
within 18 months of the date of the enactment of the statutory 
provision to which the regulation relates. 
(3) Prevention of abuse 
The Secretary may provide that any regulation may take effect 
apply retroactively to prevent abuse. 
(4) Correction of procedural defects 
The Secretary may provide that any regulation may apply 
retroactively to correct a procedural defect in the issuance of any 
prior regulation. 
(5) Internal regulations 
The limitation of paragraph (1) shall not apply to any 
regulation relating to internal Treasury Department policies, 
practices, or procedures. 
(6) Congressional authorization 
The limitation of paragraph (1) may be superseded by a 
legislative grant from Congress authorizing the Secretary to 
prescribe the effective date with respect to any regulation. 
(7) Election to apply retroactively 
The Secretary may provide for any taxpayer to elect to apply 
any 
regulation before the dates specified in paragraph (1). 
(8) Application to rulings 
The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any 
ruling (including any judicial decision or any administrative 
determination other than by regulation) relating to the internal 
revenue laws shall be applied without retroactive effect. 
(c) Preparation and distribution of regulations, forms, stamps, and 
other matters 
The Secretary shall prepare and distribute all the instructions, 
regulations, directions, forms, blanks, stamps, and other matters 
pertaining to the assessment and collection of internal revenue. 
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(d) Manner of making elections prescribed by Secretary 
Except to the extent otherwise provided by this title, any election 
under this title shall be made at such time and in such manner as the 
Secretary shall prescribe. 
(e) Temporary regulations 
(1) Issuance 
Any temporary regulation issued by the Secretary shall also be 
issued as a proposed regulation. 
(2) 3-year duration 
Any temporary regulation shall expire within 3 years after the 
date of issuance of such regulation. 
(f) Review of impact of regulations on small business 
(1) Submissions to Small Business Administration 
After publication of any proposed or temporary regulation by 
the 
Secretary, the Secretary shall submit such regulation to the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for 
comment on the impact of such regulation on small business. Not 
later than the date 4 weeks after the date of such submission, the 
Chief Counsel for Advocacy shall submit comments on such regulation 
to the Secretary. 
(2) Consideration of comments 
In prescribing any final regulation which supersedes a proposed 
or temporary regulation which had been submitted under this 
subsection to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration--
(A) the Secretary shall consider the comments of the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy on such proposed or temporary regulation, 
and 
(B) the Secretary shall discuss any response to such 
comments in the preamble of such final regulation. 
(3) Submission of certain final regulations 
In the case of the promulgation by the Secretary of any final 
regulation (other than a temporary regulation) which does not 
supersede a proposed regulation, the requirements of paragraphs (1) 
and (2) shall apply; except that--
(A) the submission under paragraph (1) shall be made at 
least 4 weeks before the date of such promulgation, and 
(B) the consideration (and discussion) required under 
paragraph (2) shall be made in connection with the promulgation 
of such final regulation. 
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40 U.S.C. § 255 
Sec. 255. Approval of title prior to Federal land purchases; 
payment of title expenses; application to Tennessee Valley 
Authority; Federal jurisdiction over acquisitions 
Unless the Attorney General gives prior written approval of the 
sufficiency of the title to land for the purpose for which the property 
LS being acquired by the United States, public money may not be 
expended 
for the purchase of the land or any interest therein. 
The Attorney General may delegate his responsibility under this 
section to other departments and agencies, subject to his general 
supervision and in accordance with regulations promulgated by him. 
Any Federal department or agency which has been delegated the 
responsibility to approve land titles under this section may request 
the 
Attorney General to render his opinion as to the validity of the title 
to any real property or interest therein, or may request the advice or 
assistance of the Attorney General in connection with determinations as 
to the sufficiency of titles. 
Except where otherwise authorized by law or provided by contract, 
the expenses of procuring certificates of titles or other evidences of 
title as the Attorney General may require may be paid out of the 
appropriations for the acquisition of land or out of the appropriations 
made for the contingencies of the acquiring department or agency. 
The foregoing provisions of this section shall not be construed to 
affect in any manner any existing provisions of law which are 
applicable 
to the acquisition of lands or interests in land by the Tennessee 
Valley 
Authority. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the obtaining of 
exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over lands or interests 
therein which have been or shall hereafter be acquired by it shall not 
be required; but the head or other authorized officer of any department 
or independent establishment or agency of the Government may, in such 
cases and at such times as he may deem desirable, accept or secure from 
the State in which any lands or interests therein under his immediate 
jurisdiction, custody, or control are situated, consent to or cession 
of 
such jurisdiction, exclusive or partial, not theretofore obtained, over 
any such lands or interests as he may deem desirable and indicate 
acceptance of such jurisdiction on behalf of the United States by 
filing 
a notice of such acceptance with the Governor of such State or in such 
other manner as may be prescribed by the laws of the State where such 
Lands are situated. Unless and until the United States has accepted 
jurisdiction over lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall 
be conclusively presumed that no such jurisdiction has been accepted. 
44 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. 
TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS 
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CHAPTER 15--FEDERAL REGISTER AND CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
Sec. 1501. Definitions 
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires--
"document" means a Presidential proclamation or Executive 
order and an order, regulation, rule, certificate, code of fair 
competition, license, notice, or similar instrument, issued, 
prescribed, or promulgated by a Federal agency; 
"Federal agency'' or "agency'' means the President of the 
United States, or an executive department, independent board, 
establishment, bureau, agency, institution, commission, or separate 
office of the administrative branch of the Government of the United 
States but not the legislative or judicial branches of the 
Government; 
"person'' means an individual, partnership, association, or 
corporation; and 
"National Archives of the United States'' has the same meaning 
as in section 2901(11) of this title. 
Sec. 1502. Custody and printing of Federal documents; 
appointment of Director 
The Archivist of the United States, acting through the Office of 
the 
Federal Register, is charged with the custody and, together with the 
Public Printer, with the prompt and uniform printing and distribution 
of 
the documents required or authorized to be published by section 1505 of 
this title. There shall be at the head of the Office a director, 
appointed by, and who shall act under the general direction of, the 
Archivist of the United States in carrying out this chapter and the 
regulations prescribed under it. 
Sec. 1503. Filing documents with Office; notation of time; 
public inspection; transmission for printing 
The original and two duplicate originals or certified copies of a 
document required or authorized to be published by section 1505 of this 
title shall be filed with the Office of the Federal Register, which 
shall be open for that purpose during all hours of the working days 
when 
the National Archives Building is open for official business. The 
Archivist of the United States shall cause to be noted on the original 
and duplicate originals or certified copies of each document the day 
and 
hour of filing. When the original is issued, prescribed, or promulgated 
outside the District of Columbia, and certified copies are filed before 
the filing of the original, the notation shall be of the day and hour 
of 
filing of the certified copies. Upon filing, at least one copy shall be 
immediately available for public inspection in the Office. The original 
shall be retained by the National Archives and Records Administration 
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and shall be available for inspection under regulations prescribed by 
the Archivist, unless such original is disposed of in accordance with 
disposal schedules submitted by the Administrative Committee of the 
Federal Register and authorized by the Archivist pursuant to 
regulations 
issued under chapter 33 of this title; however, originals of 
proclamations of the President and Executive orders shall be 
permanently 
retained by the Administration as part of the National Archives of the 
United States. The Office shall transmit immediately to the Government 
Printing Office for printing, as provided by this chapter, one 
duplicate 
original or certified copy of each document required or authorized to 
be 
published by section 1505 of this title. Every Federal agency shall 
cause to be transmitted for filing the original and the duplicate 
originals or certified copies of all such documents issued, prescribed, 
or promulgated by the agency. 
Sec. 1504. Federal Register'1; printing; contents; 
distribution; price 
Documents required or authorized to be published by section 1505 of 
this title shall be printed and distributed immediately by the 
Government Printing Office in a serial publication designated the 
Federal Register.ff The Public Printer shall make available the 
facilities of the Government Printing Office for the prompt printing 
and 
distribution of the Federal Register in the manner and at the times 
required by this chapter and the regulations prescribed under it. The 
contents of the daily issues shall be indexed and shall comprise all 
documents, required or authorized to be published, filed with the 
Office 
of the Federal Register up to the time of the day immediately preceding 
the day of distribution fixed by regulations under this chapter. There 
shall be printed with each document a copy of the notation, required to 
be made by section 1503 of this title, of the day and hour when, upon 
filing with the Office, the document was made available for public 
inspection. Distribution shall be made by delivery or by deposit at a 
post office at a time in the morning of the day of distribution fixed 
by 
regulations prescribed under this chapter. The prices to be charged for 
the Federal Register may be fixed by the Administrative Committee of 
the 
Federal Register established by section 1506 of this title without 
reference to the restrictions placed upon and fixed for the sale of 
Government publications by sections 1705 and 1708 of this title. 
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1274.) 
Sec. 1505. Documents to be published in Federal Register 
~15~ 
Appellant's Brief Addendum 1 
(a) Proclamations and Executive Orders; Documents Having General 
Applicability and Legal Effect; Documents Required To Be Published by 
Congress. There shall be published in the Federal Register--
(1) Presidential proclamations and Executive orders, except 
those not having general applicability and legal effect or 
effective 
only against Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as 
officers, agents, or employees thereof; 
(2) documents or classes of documents that the President may 
determine from time to time have general applicability and legal 
effect; and 
(3) documents or classes of documents that may be required so 
to 
be published by Act of Congress. 
For the purposes of this chapter every document or order which 
prescribes a penalty has general applicability and legal effect. 
(b) Documents Authorized To Be Published by Regulations; Comments 
and News Items Excluded. In addition to the foregoing there shall also 
be published in the Federal Register other documents or classes of 
documents authorized to be published by regulations prescribed under 
this chapter with the approval of the President, but comments or news 
items of any character may not be published in the Federal Register. 
(c) Suspension of Requirements for Filing of Documents; Alternate 
Systems for Promulgating, Filing, or Publishing Documents; Preservation 
of Originals. In the event of an attack or threatened attack upon the 
continental United States and a determination by the President that as 
a 
result of an attack or threatened attack--
(1) publication of the Federal Register or filing of documents 
with the Office of the Federal Register is impracticable, or 
(2) under existing conditions publication in the Federal 
Register would not serve to give appropriate notice to the public 
of 
the contents of documents, the President may, without regard to any 
other provision of law, suspend all or part of the requirements of 
law or regulation for filing with the Office or publication in the 
Federal Register of documents or classes of documents. 
The suspensions shall remain in effect until revoked by the 
President, or by concurrent resolution of the Congress. The President 
shall establish alternate systems for promulgating, filing, or 
publishing documents or classes of documents affected by such 
suspensions, including requirements relating to their effectiveness or 
validity, that may be considered under the then existing circumstances 
practicable to provide public notice of the issuance and of the 
contents 
of the documents. The alternate systems may, without limitation, 
provide 
for the use of regional or specialized publications or depositories for 
documents, or of the press, the radio, or similar mediums of general 
communication. Compliance with alternate systems of filing or 
publication shall have the same effect as filing with the Office or 
publication in the Federal Register under this chapter or other law or 
regulation. With respect to documents promulgated under alternate 
systems, each agency shall preserve the original and two duplicate 
originals cr two certified copies for filing with the Office when the 
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President determines that it is practicable. 
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1274.) 
Sec. 1506. Administrative Committee of the Federal Register; 
establishment and composition; powers and duties 
The Administrative Committee of the Federal Register shall consist 
of the Archivist of the United States or Acting Archivist, who shall be 
chairman, an officer of the Department of Justice designated by the 
Attorney General, and the Public Printer or Acting Public Printer. The 
Director of the Federal Register shall act as secretary of the 
committee. The committee shall prescribe, with the approval of the 
President, regulations for carrying out this chapter. The regulations 
shall provide, among other things--
(1) the manner of certification of copies required to be 
certified under section 1503 of this title, which certification may 
be permitted to be based upon confirmed communications from outside 
the District of Columbia; 
(2) the documents which shall be authorized under section 
1505 (b) of this title to be published in the Federal Register; 
(3) the manner and form in which the Federal Register shall be 
printed, reprinted, and compiled, indexed, bound, and distributed; 
(4) the number of copies of the Federal Register, which shall 
be 
printed, reprinted, and compiled, the number which shall be 
distributed without charge to Members of Congress, officers and 
employees of the United States, or Federal agency, for official 
use, 
and the number which shall be available for distribution to the 
public; and 
(5) the prices to be charged for individual copies of, and 
subscriptions to, the Federal Register and reprints and bound 
volumes of it. 
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1275; Pub. L. 98-497, title I, 
Sec. 107(b)(5), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2287.) 
Sec. 1507. Filing document as constructive notice; publication 
in Federal Register as presumption of validity; judicial 
notice; 
citation 
A document required by section 1505(a) of this title to be 
published 
in the Federal Register is not valid as against a person who has not 
had 
actual knowledge of it until the duplicate originals or certified 
copies 
of the document have been filed with the Office of the Federal Register 
and a copy made available for public inspection as provided by section 
1503 of this title. Unless otherwise specifically provided by statute, 
filing of a document, required or authorized to be published by section 
1505 of this title, except in cases where notice by publication is 
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insufficient in law, is sufficient to give notice of the contents of 
the 
document to a person subject to or affected by it. The publication in 
the Federal Register of a document creates a rebuttable presumption--
(L) that it was duly issued, prescribed, or promulgated; 
(2) that it was filed with the Office of the Federal Register 
and made available for public inspection at the day and hour stated 
in the printed notation; 
(3) that the copy contained in the Federal Register is a true 
copy of the original; and 
(4) that all requirements of this chapter and the regulations 
prescribed under it relative to the document have been complied 
with. 
The contents of the Federal Register shall be judicially noticed 
and 
without piejudice to any other mode of citation, may be cited by volume 
and page number. 
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1276.) 
Sec. 1508 Publication in Federal Register as notice of hearing 
A not ice of hearing or of opportunity to be heard, required or 
authorized to be given by an Act of Congress, or which may otherwise 
properly be given, shall be deemed to have been given to all persons 
residing within the States of the Union and the District of Columbia, 
except in cases where notice by publication is insufficient in law, 
when 
the notice is published in the Federal Register at such a time that the 
period between the publication and the date fixed in the notice for the 
hearing oi for the termination of the opportunity to be heard i s — 
(1) not less than the time specifically prescribed for the 
publication of the notice by the appropriate Act of Congress; or 
(2) not less than fifteen days when time for publication is not 
specifically prescribed by the Act, without prejudice, however, to 
the effectiveness of a notice of less than fifteen days where the 
shorter period is reasonable. 
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1276.) 
Sec, 1509. Costs of publication, etc. 
(a) The cost of printing, reprinting, wrapping, binding, and 
distributing the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, 
and, except as provided in subsection (b), other expenses incurred by 
the Government Printing Office in carrying out the duties placed upon 
it 
by this chapter shall be charged to the revolving fund provided in 
section 309. Reimbursements for such costs and expenses shall be made 
by 
the Federal agencies and credited, together with all receipts, as 
provided m section 309(b). 
(b) The cost of printing, reprinting, wrapping, binding, and 
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distributing all other publications of the Federal Register program, 
and 
other expenses incurred by the Government Printing Office in connection 
with such publications, shall be borne by the appropriations to the 
Government Printing Office and the appropriations are made available, 
and are authorized to be increased by additional sums necessary for the 
purposes, the increases to be based upon estimates submitted by the 
Public Printer. 
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1277/ Pub. L. 95-94, title IV, 
Sec. 408(a)(1), Aug. 5, 1977, 91 Stat. 683.) 
Historical and Revision Notes 
Based on 44 U.S. Code, 1964 ed., Sec. 309 (July 26, 1935, ch. 417, 
Sec. 9, 49 Stat. 502). 
A reference to section 10 of Act June 19, 1934 is deleted because 
of 
the repeal of that section by Act June 30, 1949. 
Sec. 1510. Code of Federal Regulations 
(a) The Administrative Committee of the Federal Register, with the 
approval of the President, may require, from time to time as it 
considers necessary, the preparation and publication in special or 
supplemental editions of the Federal Register of complete codifications 
of the documents of each agency of the Government having general 
applicability and legal effect, issued or promulgated by the agency by 
publication in the Federal Register or by filing with the 
Administrative 
Committee, and are relied upon by the agency as authority for, or are 
invoked or used by it in the discharge of, its activities or functions, 
and are in effect as to facts arising on or after dates specified by 
the 
Administrative Committee. 
(b) A codification published under subsection (a) of this section 
shall be printed and bound in permanent form and shall be designated as 
the 'sCode of Federal Regulations.'1 The Administrative Committee shall 
regulate the binding of the printed codifications into separate books 
with a view to practical usefulness and economical manufacture. Each 
book shall contain an explanation of its coverage and other aids to 
users that the Administrative Committee may require. A general index to 
the entire Code of Federal Regulations shall be separately printed and 
bound. 
(c) The Administrative Committee shall regulate the supplementation 
and the collation and republication of the printed codifications with a 
view to keeping the Code of Federal Regulations as current as 
practicable. Each book shall be either supplemented or collated and 
republished at least once each calendar year. 
(d) The Office of the Federal Register shall prepare and publish 
the 
codifications, supplements, collations, and indexes authorized by this 
section. 
(e) The codified documents of the several agencies published in the 
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supplemental edition of the Federal Register under this section, as 
amended by documents subsequently filed with the Office and published 
in 
the daily issues of the Federal Register shall be prima facie evidence 
of the text of the documents and of the fact that they are in effect on 
and after the date of publication. 
(f) The Administrative Committee shall prescribe, with the approval 
of the President, regulations for carrying out this section. 
(g) This section does not require codification of the text of 
Presidential documents published and periodically compiled in 
supplements to Title 3 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1277.) 
Sec. 1511. International agreements excluded from provisions of 
chapter 
This chapter does not apply to treaties, conventions, protocols, 
and 
other international agreements, or proclamations thereof by the 
President. 
(Pub. L. 90-620, Oct. 22, 1968, 82 Stat. 1278.) 
State Statutes 
U.C.A. § 59-1-210 (5) 
59-1-210. General powers and duties. 
The powers and duties of the commission are as follows: 
(5) to administer and supervise the tax laws of the state; 
U.C.A. § 59-1-707 
59-1-707. Writ of mandate requiring taxpayer to file return. 
(1) (a) If a taxpayer fails to file any return required pursuant to Title 59 
within 60 days of the time prescribed, the commission may petition for a writ of 
mandate to compel the taxpayer to file the return. The petition may be filed, in 
the discretion of the commission, in the Tax Division of the Third Judicial 
District or in the district court for the county in which the taxpayer resides or 
has his principal place of business. In the case of a nonresident taxpayer the 
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petition shall be filed in the ' I hird District Court. 
(b) The court shall grant a hearing on the petition for a writ of mandate 
within 20 days after the filing of the petition or as soon thereafter as the court 
may determine, having regard foi the rights of the parties and the necessity of a 
speedy determination of the petition. 
(c) Upon a finding of failure to file a return within 60 days of the time 
prescribed pursuant to Title 59, the court shall issue a writ of mandate requiring 
the taxpayer to file a return. The order of the court shall include an award of 
attorneys' fees, court costs, witness fees, and all other costs in favor of the 
prevailing party. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall linui ihe remedies otherwise available to the 
commission under Title 59 or i>ther laws of this state. 
102 
59-10-102. laration of intent 
The intent of the Legislature in the enactment of this chapter is to accomplish 
the following objectives: 
(1) to impose on each resident individual, estate, or trust for each taxable year a 
tax measured by the amount of his "taxable income" for such year, as determined 
for federal income tax purposes, subject to certain adjustments; and 
(2) to impose on each nonresident individual, estate, or trust for each taxable 
year a tax measured by the amount allocable to this Mate of his "taxabie IIK ome" 
for such year, as determined for federal income tax purposes, subjeci u> cei tain 
adjustments; and 
(3) to adopt for Utah individual income tax purposes, by reference, the 
provisions of the federal income tax laws which are applicable in arriving at the 
amount of income subject to tax for federal income tax purposes which, it is 
believed, will: 
(a) promote consistency in tax treatment of persons required ir tile returns of 
income for both federal individual iikume tax and I Mali null* iduai aieome tax 
purposes; and 
(b) enable a taxpayer to prepare his required Utah income tax return foi any 
taxable year with a minimum expenditure of additional time and effort after 
having prepared his federal income tax return for such year; 
(4) to conform, to the extent practicable, certain of the existing rules of 
procedure under and foi tl le administration of the Utah individual income tax law 
to corresponding or apposite rules of administration and procedure prescribed by 
the federal income tax laws, with a view to reduction of duplication of effort, 
promotion of better understanding of requirements, and greater consistency 
between state and federal procedures and administration 
• -21 
Appellant's Brief Addendum 1 
ILC.A. § 59-10-103 (1) (w) 
59-10-103. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(w) "Taxpayer" means any individual, estate, or trust or beneficiary of an estate 
or trust, whose income is subject in whole or part to the tax imposed by this 
chapter. 
U.C.A.§ 59-10-112 
59-10-112. State taxable income of resident individual. 
"State taxable income" in the case of a resident individual means his federal 
taxable income (as defined by Section 59-10-111) with the modifications, 
subtractions, and adjustments provided in Section 59-10-114. The state taxable 
income of a resident individual who is the beneficiary of an estate or trust shall be 
modified by the adjustments provided in Section 59-10-209. 
U.C.A. § 59-10-502 
59-10-502. Persons required to file returns. 
An income tax return with respect to the tax imposed by this chapter shall be 
filed by: 
(1) every resident individual, estate, or trust required to file a federal income 
tax return for the taxable year; and 
(2) every nonresident individual, estate, or trust having federal gross income 
derived from sources within the state for the taxable year and required to file a 
federal income tax return for such taxable year. 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-l et seq. (Utah Administrative Procedures Act) 
63-46b-0.5. Short title. 
This act is known as the "Administrative Procedures Act." 
Enacted by Chapter 87, 1991 General Session 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter. 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by a statute 
superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the provisions 
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of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern: 
(a) state agency action that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, 
or other legal interests of ati identifiable person, including agency action to grant, deny, 
revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or ^mcnd an authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of the action. 
(2) This chapter does not govern: 
(a) the procedure for making agency rules, or judicial review of the procedure or rules; 
(b) the issuance of a notice of a deficiency in the payment of a tax, the decisioi i to 
waive a penalty or interest on taxes, the imposition of and penalty or interest on taxes, or 
the issuance of a tax assessment, except that this chapter governs an agency action 
commenced by a taxpayer or by another person authorized by law to contest the validity 
or correctness of the action; 
(c) state agency action relating to extradition, to the granting of a pardon or parole, a 
commutation or termination of a sentence, or to the rescission, termination, or revocation 
of parole or probation, to the discipline of, resolution of a grievance of, supervision of, 
confinement of, or the treatment of an inmate or resident of a correctional facility, the 
Utah State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center., or a pci>oi: it, me eusnuh or 
jurisdiction of the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health. 01 a person on 
probation or parole, or judicial review of the action; 
(d) state agency action to evaluate, discipline, employ, transfer, reassign, 01 promote a 
student or teacher in a school or educational institution, or judicial review of the action; 
(e) an application for empIo\ ment and inicrnal personnel action A itliin an agency 
concerning its own employees, or judicial review of the action; 
(f) the issuance of a citation or assessment under Title 34A, Chapter 6, Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title 58, Chapter 3a, Architect Licensing Act, 
Chapter 11a, Cosmetologist/Barber, Esthetician, Electrologist, and Nail I echnician 
Licensing Act, Chapter 17b, Pharmacy Practice Act, Chapter 22, Professional Engineers 
and Professional Land Surveyor Licensing Act, Chapter 53, Landscape Architects 
Licensing Act, Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, Chapter 63, 
Security Personnel Licensing Act, and Chapter 76, Professional Geologist Licensing Act, 
except that this chapter governs an agency action commenced by the employer, licensee, 
or other person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the citation, or 
assessment; 
(g) state agency action relating to management of state funds, the management aiiu 
disposal of school and institutional trust land assets, and contracts for the purchase or sale 
of products, real property, supplies, goods, or services by or for the state, or by o\ lor an 
agency of the state, except as provided in those contracts, or judicial review of the action 
(h) state agency action under Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3, Powers and Duties of 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, Title 7, Chapter 2, Possession of Depository 
Institution by Commissioner, Title 7, Chapter 19, Acquisition of Failing Depository 
Institutions or Holding Companies, and Title 63, Chapter M). I !tah Go\ernniental 
Immunity Act, or judicial review of the action; 
(i) the initial determination of a person's eligibility for unemployment benefits, the 
initial determination of a person's eligibility for benefits under Title 34A, Chapter 2, 
Workers' 
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Compensation Act, and Title 34A, Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, or the 
initial determination of a person's unemployment tax liability; 
(j) state agency action relating to the distribution or award of a monetary grant to or 
between governmental units, or for research, development, or the arts, or judicial review 
of the action; 
(k) the issuance of a notice of violation or order under Title 26, Chapter 8a, Utah 
Emergency Medical Services System Act, Title 19, Chapter 2, Air Conservation Act, 
Title 19, Chapter 3, Radiation Control Act, Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe Drinking Water Act, 
Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act, Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1, Solid and Hazardous 
Waste Act, Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 4, Underground Storage Tank Act, or Title 19, 
Chapter 6, Part 7, Used Oil Management Act, except that this chapter governs an agency 
action commenced by a person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of 
the notice or order; 
(1) state agency action, to the extent required by federal statute or regulation, to be 
conducted according to federal procedures; 
(m) the initial determination of a person's eligibility for government or public 
assistance benefits; 
(n) state agency action relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and certificates of 
registration; 
(o) a license for use of state recreational facilities; 
(p) state agency action under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and 
Management Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603; 
(q) state agency action relating to the collection of water commissioner fees and 
delinquency penalties, or judicial review of the action; 
(r) state agency action relating to the installation, maintenance, and repair of 
headgates, caps, values, or other water controlling works and weirs, flumes, meters, or 
other water measuring devices, or judicial review of the action; 
(s) (i) a hearing conducted by the Division of Securities under Section 61-1-11.1; and 
(ii) an action taken by the Division of Securities pursuant to a hearing conducted 
under Section 61-1-11.1, including a determination regarding the fairness of an issuance 
or exchange of securities described in Subsection 61-1-11.1(1); and 
(t) state agency action relating to water well driller licenses, water well drilling 
permits, water well driller registration, or water well drilling construction standards, or 
judicial review of the action. 
(3) This chapter does not affect a legal remedy otherwise available to: 
(a) compel an agency to take action; or 
(b) challenge an agency's rule. 
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an adjudicative 
proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative proceeding from: 
(a) requesting or ordering a conference with parties and interested persons to: 
(i) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(iii) simplify the evidence; 
(iv) facilitate discovery; or 
(v) expedite the proceeding; or 
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(b) grai itii lg a tii it leb ' I t 1 : ;!:i )! i to disi it liss c i; foi si u i n i. ia,i ; >* JI idj 51 1 1 :M it if tl M * 1 eqi lirei t lei its 
of ' ' ' 
Rule 12(b) or Rule 56 of the I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, 
except to the extent that the requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter. 
(5) (a) A declaratory proceeding authorized by Section 63-46b-21 is not governs i 
this chapter, except as explicitly provided in that section. 
(b) Judicial review of a declaratory proceeding authorized by Section *> t-4oh*: - , 
governed by this chapter. 
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting a rule affecting or 
governing an adjudicative proceeding or from following the rule, if the rule is enacted 
according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, and if the rule conforms to the requirements of this chaptei 
(7) (a) If the attorney general issues a written determination that a provision of this 
chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to an agency of the state from the 
federal government, the applicability of the provision to that agency shall be suspended to 
the extent necessary to prevent the denial. 
(b) The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature at its next 
session. 
(8) Nothing 111 this chapter may be mien-•<>< • * ; i : 
jurisdiction to review final agency action. 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding officer, for good 
cause shown, from lengthening or shortening a time period prescribed in this chapter, 
except the time period established for ji idicial review. 
Amended by Chapter 235, 2004 General Session 
63-46b-2. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an agency actioi1 01 proceeding described in 
Section 63-46b-l . 
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, department, division, officer, council, 
office, committee, bureau, or other administrative unit of this state, including the agency 
head, agency employees, or other persons acting on behalf of or under the authority of the 
agency head, but does not mean the Legislature, the courts, the governor, any political 
subdivision of the state, or any administrative unit of a political subdivision of the state. 
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body of individuals in whom the ultimate 
legal authority of the agency is vested by statute. 
(d) "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceeding authorized and governed by Section 
63-46b-21. 
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certification, approval, registration, charter, 
or similar form of authorization required by statute. 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative proceeding, 
all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to intervene w -
proceeding, j . id all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties 
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in an adjudicative proceeding. 
(g) "Person" means an individual, group of individuals, partnership, corporation, 
association, political subdivision or its units, governmental subdivision or its units, public 
or private organization or entity of any character, or another agency. 
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an individual or body of 
individuals designated by the agency head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to conduct 
an adjudicative proceeding. 
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised, an agency may substitute one 
presiding officer for another during any proceeding. 
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one phase of a proceeding need not 
continue as presiding officer through all phases of a proceeding. 
(i) "Respondent" means a person against whom an adjudicative proceeding is initiated, 
whether by an agency or any other person. 
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency required or authorized by law to review the 
orders of another agency. 
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from designating by rule the names or 
titles of the agency head or the presiding officers with responsibility for adjudicative 
proceedings before the agency. 
Amended by Chapter 169, 1988 General Session 
63-46b-2.1. Bases for certain recommendations and decisions limited. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), no agency may recommend or rule on the 
custody, placement, including foster placement, or other disposition alternative for a 
minor, or the termination of parental rights, based on the fact that a parent or guardian of 
the minor lawfully does one or more of the following: 
(a) legally possesses or uses a firearm or other weapon; 
(b) espouses particular religious beliefs; or 
(c) schools the minor or other minors outside the public education system or is 
otherwise sympathetic to schooling a minor outside the public education system. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not prohibit a recommendation or ruling based on the 
compatibility of a minor with a particular custody, placement, or other disposition 
alternative as determined by the presence of any of the factors in Subsections (l)(a) 
through (l)(c). 
Enacted by Chapter 344, 2004 General Session 
63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all adjudicative proceedings 
shall be commenced by either: 
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the agency; or 
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by persons other than 
the agency. 
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the following 
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requirements: 
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding officer, and 
shall inchiik-
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice is being given by 
the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mailing address of any attorney or 
employee who has been designated to appear for the agency; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed; 
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be conducted informally 
according to the provisions of rules adopted under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or 
formally according to the provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-• r 
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that each respondent 
must file a written response within 30 (lavs of the mailing date of the -oowee of agency 
action; 
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is required by statute 
or rule, a statement oi lhe i .-^ .u«d place of any scheduled hearing, a statement of the 
purpose for \* hich the hearing is to be held, and a statement that a party who fails to 
attend or participate in the hearing may be held in default; 
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing is required by 
statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be requested by a party within 
the time prescribed by rule, a statement that the parties may request a hearing witlliii the 
time provided by the agency's rules; 
(ix) a statement of the legal author it ;i 
proceeding is to be maintained; 
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and iJephone imuber of the presiding officer; and 
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and. to the extent known 
by the presiding officer, the questions to be decided. 
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced b; ' it! :ie agency, tl le agency :>1 mil: 
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each party; 
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if required by statute; and 
(iii) mail the notice of agency action \o anv other person who has a right to notice 
under statute or rule. 
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than the agency 
to initiate adjudicative proceedings, that person's request for agency action shall be in 
writing and signed by the person invoking the jurisdiction of the agency, or by that 
person's representative, and shall include: 
(i) the names and addresses of all persoi is to \ vi IC i i. i a c :>[: y of tl le i eqi lest for agei icy 
action is being sent; 
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known; 
(iii) the date that the request for agency action was mailed; 
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction undei wl iiicl i. agency acti : i i is 
requested; 
(v) a statement of the relief or action soughi fov: uL- ;iguicv; and 
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief or agency action. 
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(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the request with the agency and 
shall mail a copy to each person known to have a direct interest in the requested agency 
action. 
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more forms eliciting the information 
required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the request for agency action when completed 
and filed by the person requesting agency action. 
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review a request for agency action and shall: 
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is granted and that the 
adjudicative proceeding is completed; 
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is denied and, if the 
proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that the party may request a hearing 
before the agency to challenge the denial; or 
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are required to determine the 
agency's response to the request. 
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) shall contain the information 
required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by Subsection 
(3)(d)(ii). 
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3)(d) to all parties, 
except that any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) may be published when 
publication is required by statute. 
(iii) The notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) shall: 
(A) give the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(B) give the name of the proceeding; 
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of a category to be conducted informally 
according to the provisions of rules enacted under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, with 
citation to the applicable rule authorizing that designation, or formally according to 
Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll; 
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where respondent parties are 
known, state that a written response must be filed within 30 days of the date of the 
agency's notice if mailed, or within 30 days of the last publication date of the agency's 
notice, if published; 
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in an 
informal adjudicative proceeding, state the time and place of any scheduled hearing, the 
purpose for which the hearing is to be held, and that a party who fails to attend or 
participate in a scheduled and noticed hearing may be held in default; 
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal, and a hearing is required by statute 
or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be requested by a party within the 
time prescribed by rule, state the parties' right to request a hearing and the time within 
which a hearing may be requested under the agency's rules; and 
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding 
officer. 
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not governed by this chapter, but 
agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or actions are subject to the 
provisions 
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of this chapter, the request for agency action seeking re\ n * • 
agency within the time prescribed by the agency's rules. 
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency ma . h\ ruk 
provide for a longer response time than allowed by this section, and may pi\>\ idc or a 
shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable federal law. 
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order, applications for licenses 
filed under authority of Title 32A, Chapters 3, Packaging Agencies, 4, Public Liquor 
License, and 5, Private Club I .iquor License are not considered to be a request for agency 
action under this chapter. 
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award a license or oilic. 
privilege as to which there are multiple competing applicants, the agency may, by ruic *M 
order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine the award of that license or 
privilege. 
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session 
63-46b-4, Designation of adjudicative proceedings as informal — Standards ~ 
Undesignated proceedings formal. 
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings to be 
conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules enacted under the 
authority of this chapter if; 
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any procedural n^mreir'ent 
imposed by a statute other than this chapter; 
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the pai ties to the proceedings will be 
reasonably protected by the informal procedures; 
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will be enhanced 
by categorizations; and 
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedii lgs c i itweighs til le potei itial bet lefits to tl le 
public of a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all agency adjudicative proceedings 
not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules shall be 
conducted formally in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. 
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any adjudicative proceeding. ,.;. 
presiding officer may convert a formal adjudicative proceeding to an informal 
adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal adjudicative 
proceeding if: 
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and 
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any pan v. 
Enacted b w «-..,:!, i ! - icr.^ -.i , ..^n 
63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or more categories of adjudicative 
proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by rule, prescribe 
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procedures for informal adjudicative proceedings that include the following: 
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and requires a response, no answer or other 
pleading responsive to the allegations contained in the notice of agency action or the 
request for agency action need be filed. 
(b) The agency shall hold a hearing if a hearing is required by statute or rule, or if a 
hearing is permitted by rule and is requested by a party within the time prescribed by 
rule. 
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the notice of agency action or in the request 
for agency action shall be permitted to testify, present evidence, and comment on the 
issues. 
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all parties. 
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency may issue subpoenas or other orders to 
compel production of necessary evidence. 
(f) All parties shall have access to information contained in the agency's files and to 
all materials and information gathered in any investigation, to the extent permitted by 
law. 
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the agency may enact rules permitting 
intervention where a federal statute or rule requires that a state permit intervention. 
(h) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(i) Within a reasonable time after the close of an informal adjudicative proceeding, the 
presiding officer shall issue a signed order in writing that states the following: 
(i) the decision; 
(ii) the reasons for the decision; 
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative or judicial review available to the parties; 
and 
(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or requesting a review. 
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based on the facts appearing in the agency's 
files and on the facts presented in evidence at any hearings. 
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall be promptly mailed to each of the 
parties. 
(2) (a) The agency may record any hearing. 
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a reporter approved by the agency 
prepare a transcript from the agency's record of the hearing. 
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or power given 
to an agency by another statute. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
63-46b-6. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Responsive 
pleadings. 
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless modified by rule according to 
Subsection 63-46b-3(5), the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written response 
signed by the respondent or the respondent's representative within 30 days of the mailing 
date or last date of publication of the notice of agency action or the notice under 
Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include: 
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(a) the agency's file number or other reference in it i lbei :; 
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding; 
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks; 
(d) a statement of the facts; and 
(e) a statement summarizing the reasons that the relief requested should be granted. 
(2) The respondent shall send a copy of the response filed under Subsection (1) to 
each party. 
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule, may permit or require pleadings in 
addition to the notice of agency action, the request for agency action, and the response. 
All documents permitted or required to be filed shall be filed with the agency and one 
copy shall be sent to each party. 
Amended b> ( ii.tr.,: : ^ "• • <iuui.i. NC-IOJI 
63-46b-7. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings -- Discovery and 
subpoenas. 
11
 ';• form. J adjudicative proceedings, the agency may, by rule, prescribe means of 
discovery adequate to permit the parties to obtain all relevant information necessary to 
support their claims or defenses. If the agency does not enact rules under this section 
parties may conduct discovery according to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the producing 
of evidence in formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the presiding officer 
when requested bv anv partv. or may be issued by the presiding officer on his own 
motion. 
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or power given 
to an agency h\ another slaiuU: 
Enacted b\ i'; -wa iui, 1987 General Session 
63-46l>-?«. >cedures for formal adjudicative proceedings Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3 (d)(i) and (ii). u\ ait formal 
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain = .il. 
disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunii} to present 
their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or 
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the agency, and of 
technical or scientific facts *•  *i :n ilu- agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer mux not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay. 
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(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence, 
argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding 
the opportunity to present oral or written statements at the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be considered in 
reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the agency prepare 
a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that the agency is permitted by 
statute to impose to protect confidential information disclosed at the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate 
measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Intervention. 
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene in a formal 
adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes to intervene shall mail a 
copy of the petition to each party. The petition shall include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(b) the name of the proceeding; 
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights or interests are 
substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding, or that the petitioner 
qualifies as an intervenor under any provision of law; and 
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeks from the agency. 
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if the presiding officer 
determines that: 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the formal 
adjudicative proceeding; and 
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the adjudicative 
proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the intervention. 
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to intervene shall be in writing and 
mailed to the petitioner and each party. 
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the intervener's 
participation in the adjudicative proceeding that are necessary for a just, orderly, and 
prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after the intervention. 
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session 
63-46b-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings - Orders. 
In formal adjudicative proceedings: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the hearing, or after the filing of any posthearing 
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documents permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time required by any 
applicable statute or rule of the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and issue an order 
that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact based exclusively on 
evidence of record in the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially noted; 
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for the presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered by the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to administrative or judicial re^  new of tl le ordei & mailable to 
aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any reconsideration or review. 
(2) The presiding officer ma\ use the presiding officer's experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge to evaluate the evidence. 
(3) A finding of fact that was contested may not be based solely on ^- n v \ . -.ii./e 
unless that evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(4) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from issuing interim ouiers u-
(a) notify the parties of further hearings; 
(b) notify the parties of provisional rulings on a portion of the issues presented; or 
(c) otherwise provide for the fair and efficient conduct of the adjudicative proceeding. 
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session 
63-46b-ll. Default. 
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against a party if: 
(a) a party in an informal adjudicative proceeding fails to participate in the 
adjudicative proceeding; 
(b) a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to atu 
properly scheduled hearing after receiving proper notice; or 
(c) a respondent in a formal adjudicative proceeding fails to file a response under 
Section 63-46b-6. 
(2) An order of default shall >-u .,.uc a statement of the ground- \--u o,-^uu an. -!.. -il be 
mailed to all parties. 
(3) (a) A defaulted party may seek to have the agency set aside the default order, and 
any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued subsequent to the default order, by 
following the procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) A motion to set aside a default and any subsequent order shall be i i. lade to tl I * 
presiding officer. 
(c) A defaulted party may seek agency review under Seciion 63-46b-12, oi 
reconsideration under Section 63-46b-13, only on the decision of the presiding officer on 
the motion to set aside the default. 
(4) (a) In an adjudicative proceeding begun by the agency, or in an adjudicative 
proceeding begun by a party that has other parties besides the party in default, the 
presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of default, conduct any further proceedings 
necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without the participation of the party 
33' 
Appellant's Brief Addendum 1 
in default and shall determine all issues in the adjudicative proceeding, including those 
affecting the defaulting party. 
(b) In an adjudicative proceeding that has no parties other than the agency and the 
party in default, the presiding officer shall, after issuing the order of default, dismiss the 
proceeding. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
63-46b-12. Agency review — Procedure. 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties to any adjudicative proceeding to 
seek review of an order by the agency or by a superior agency, the aggrieved party may 
file a written request for review within 30 days after the issuance of the order with the 
person or entity designated for that purpose by the statute or rule. 
(b) The request shall: 
(i) be signed by the party seeking review; 
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and 
(iv) be mailed to the presiding officer and to each party. 
(2) (a) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for review, or within the time 
period provided by agency rule, whichever is longer, any party may file a response with 
the person designated by statute or rule to receive the response. 
(b) The party who files a response under Subsection (2)(a) shall mail a copy of the 
response to each of the parties and to the presiding officer. 
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an order by the agency or a 
superior agency, the agency or superior agency shall review the order within a reasonable 
time or within the time required by statute or the agency's rules. 
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may by order or rule permit the 
parties to file briefs or other documents, or to conduct oral argument. 
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all parties. 
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any response, other filings, or oral 
argument, or within the time required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or 
superior agency shall issue a written order on review. 
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head or by a person designated 
by the agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to each party. 
(c) The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, 
or modified, and whether all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be 
remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review 
available to aggrieved parties; and 
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( r i i i ) t l i.e f i i it lie lii i lits applicable to ai :ty appeal 01 review. 
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session 
63-465-13. Agency review -- Reconsideration. 
(1) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued lor w Inch review b\ the 
agency or by a superior agency under Sectioii 63-461* ! 2 unavailable, and it the order 
would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a written request for 
reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific grounds upon which relief is 
requested. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the filinsz of ihe request is not a prerequisite 
for seeking judicial review of the order. 
(2) The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the agency ai id oi ic copy si mil 
be mailed to each party by the person making the request. 
(3) (a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue a written 
order granting the request or denying the request. 
f • ' Tf the aiiene> head or the person designated for that purpose does not issue an 
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration sir 
considered to be denied, 
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Notion 
63-46b-I4. Judicial review ~ Exhaustion of adi ninistrative i emedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in 
actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting aii adimni.Virativ e remedies 
,M i ilable, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this 
chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is tlot required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust 
any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate u ? I w 
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within ! > 
days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13 (3) (b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents 
at id shall i neet the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
Amended b\ < hapter 72, 1988 General Session 
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63-46b-15. Judicial review -- Informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency 
actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile courts 
have jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating to 
(1) the removal or placement of children m state custody, 
(n) the support of children under Subsection (l)(a)(i) as determined administratively 
under Section 78-3a-906, and 
(m) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect made by the Division of Child and 
Family Services, after an evidentiary hearing 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as 
provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of such a venue provision, 
in the county where the petitioner resides or maintains the petitioner's principal place of 
business 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be a 
complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall include 
(I) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review, 
(n) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency, 
(in) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, together with a copy, 
summary, or brief description of the agency action, 
(IV) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal adjudicative 
proceedings that led to the agency action, 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding, 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review, 
(vn) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested, and 
(vin) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law 
and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this section 
Amended by Chapter 120, 2001 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action 
with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the 
appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional 
filings and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of 
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formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the 
record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the district court or 
the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award 
damages or compensation only to the extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by 
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a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
Enacted by Chapter 161, 1987 General Session 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other temporary remedies pending final 
disposition. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the agency may grant a stay of its order or 
other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, according to the agency's 
rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or other temporary remedies unless 
extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a 
party, the agency's order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall specify the 
reasons why the stay or other temporary remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public 
health, safety, or welfare against a substantial threat, the court may not grant a stay or 
other temporary remedy unless it finds that: 
(a) the agency violated its own rules in denying the stay; or 
(b) (i) the party seeking judicial review is likely to prevail on the merits when the 
court finally disposes of the matter; 
(ii) the party seeking judicial review will suffer irreparable injury without immediate 
relief; 
(iii) granting relief to the party seeking review will not substantially harm other parties 
to the proceedings; and 
(iv) the threat to the public health, safety, or welfare relied upon by the agency is not 
sufficiently serious to justify the agency's action under the circumstances. 
Enacted by Chapter 161, 1987 General Session 
63-46b-19. Civil enforcement. 
(1) (a) In addition to other remedies provided by law, an agency may seek 
enforcement of an order by seeking civil enforcement in the district courts. 
(b) The action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order must name, as 
defendants, each alleged violator against whom the agency seeks to obtain civil 
enforcement. 
(c) Venue for an action seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order shall be 
determined by the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(d) The action may request, and the court may grant, any of the following: 
(i) declaratory relief; 
(ii) temporary or permanent injunctive relief; 
(iii) any other civil remedy provided by law; or 
(iv) any combination of the foregoing. 
(2) (a) Any person whose interests are directly impaired or threatened by the failure of 
an agency to enforce an agency's order may timely file a complaint seeking civil 
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enforcement of that order, but the action may not be commenced: 
(i) until at least 30 days after the plaintiff has given notice of his intent to seek civil 
enforcement of the alleged violation to the agency head, the attorney general, and to each 
alleged violator against whom the petitioner seeks civil enforcement; 
(ii) if the agency has filed and is diligently prosecuting a complaint seeking civil 
enforcement of the same order against the same or a similarly situated defendant; or 
(iii) if a petition for judicial review of the same order has been filed and is pending in 
court. 
(b) The complaint seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order must name, as 
defendants, the agency whose order is sought to be enforced, the agency that is vested 
with the power to enforce the order, and each alleged violator against whom the plaintiff 
seeks civil enforcement. 
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized by statute, a complaint seeking civil 
enforcement of an agency's order may not request, and the court may not grant, any 
monetary payment apart from taxable costs. 
(3) In a proceeding for civil enforcement of an agency's order, in addition to any other 
defenses allowed by law, a defendant may defend on the ground that: 
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued by an agency without jurisdiction to 
issue the order; 
(b) the order does not apply to the defendant; 
(c) the defendant has not violated the order; or 
(d) the defendant violated the order but has subsequently complied. 
(4) Decisions on complaints seeking civil enforcement of an agency's order are 
reviewable in the same manner as other civil cases. 
Enacted by Chapter 161, 1987 General Session 
63-46b-20. Emergency adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) An agency may issue an order on an emergency basis without complying with the 
requirements of this chapter if: 
(a) the facts known by the agency or presented to the agency show that an immediate 
and significant danger to the public health, safety, or welfare exists; and 
(b) the threat requires immediate action by the agency. 
(2) In issuing its emergency order, the agency shall: 
(a) limit its order to require only the action necessary to prevent or avoid the danger to 
the public health, safety, or welfare; 
(b) issue promptly a written order, effective immediately, that includes a brief 
statement of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for the agency's utilization 
of emergency adjudicative proceedings; and 
(c) give immediate notice to the persons who are required to comply with the order. 
(3) If the emergency order issued under this section will result in the continued 
infringement or impairment of any legal right or interest of any party, the agency shall 
commence a formal adjudicative proceeding in accordance with the other provisions of 
this chapter. 
~39~ 
Appellant's Brief Addendum 1 
Enacted by Chapter 161, 1987 General Session 
63-46b-21. Declaratory orders. 
(1) Any person may file a request for agency action, requesting that the agency issue a 
declaratory order determining the applicability of a statute, rule, or order within the 
primary jurisdiction of the agency to specified circumstances. 
(2) Each agency shall issue rules that: 
(a) provide for the form, contents, and filing of petitions for declaratory orders; 
(b) provide for the disposition of the petitions; 
(c) define the classes of circumstances in which the agency will not issue a declaratory 
order; 
(d) are consistent with the public interest and with the general policy of this chapter; 
and 
(e) facilitate and encourage agency issuance of reliable advice. 
(3) (a) An agency may not issue a declaratory order if: 
(i) the request is one of a class of circumstances that the agency has by rule defined as 
being exempt from declaratory orders; or 
(ii) the person requesting the declaratory order participated in an adjudicative 
proceeding concerning the same issue within 12 months of the date of the present request. 
(b) An agency may issue a declaratory order that would substantially prejudice the 
rights of a person who would be a necessary party, only if that person consents in writing 
to the determination of the matter by a declaratory proceeding. 
(4) Persons may intervene in declaratory proceedings if: 
(a) they meet the requirements of Section 63-46b-9; and 
(b) they file timely petitions for intervention according to agency rules. 
(5) An agency may provide, by rule or order, that other provisions of Sections 63-46b-
4 through 63-46b-13 apply to declaratory proceedings. 
(6) (a) After receipt of a petition for a declaratory order, the agency may issue a 
written order: 
(i) declaring the applicability of the statute, rule, or order in question to the specified 
circumstances; 
(ii) setting the matter for adjudicative proceedings; 
(iii) agreeing to issue a declaratory order within a specified time; or 
(iv) declining to issue a declaratory order and stating the reasons for its action. 
(b) A declaratory order shall contain: 
(i) the names of all parties to the proceeding on which it is based; 
(ii) the particular facts on which it is based; and 
(iii) the reasons for its conclusion. 
(c) A copy of all orders issued in response to a request for a declaratory proceeding 
shall be mailed promptly to the petitioner and any other parties. 
(d) A declaratory order has the same status and binding effect as any other order 
issued in an adjudicative proceeding. 
(7) Unless the petitioner and the agency agree in writing to an extension, if an agency 
has not issued a declaratory order within 60 days after receipt of the petition for a 
declaratory order, the petition is denied. 
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Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session 
63-46b-22. Transition procedures. 
(1) The procedures for agency action, agency review, and judicial review contained in 
this chapter are applicable to all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or 
before an agency on or after January 1, 1988. 
(2) Statutes and rules governing agency action, agency review, and judicial review 
that are in effect on December 31, 1987, govern all agency adjudicative proceedings 
commenced by or before an agency on or before December 31, 1987, even if those 
proceedings are still pending before an agency or a court on January 1, 1988. 
Amended by Chapter 5, 1991 General Session 
63-46b-23. Electronic records and conversion of written records by 
governmental agencies. 
A governmental agency may make rules regarding electronic records and conversion 
of written records as prescribed by Title 46, Chapter 4, Part 5, Electronic Records in 
Government Agencies. 
Enacted by Chapter 138, 2001 General Session 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3 (2) (j) 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
Other Authorities 
Executive Order # 10289 
See Addendum 2. 
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Rules 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7 (a) — The Indictment and the 
Information. 
(a) When Used. 
(1) Felony. 
An offense (other than criminal contempt) must be prosecuted by an indictment if 
it is punishable: 
(A) by death; or 
(B) by imprisonment for more than one year. 
(2) Misdemeanor. 
An offense punishable by imprisonment for one year or less may be prosecuted in 
accordance with Rule 58(b)(1). 
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 (d). 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if 
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, 
report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian 
or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), 
Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information 
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not 
conducted for profit. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
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(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal 
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the 
statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a 
person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is 
(A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, 
or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its 
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement 
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant 
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during 
the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party 
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of 
declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
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(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or 
immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the 
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition 
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but 
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of 
declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made 
for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or 
past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character 
of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis 
or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about 
which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to 
enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or 
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to 
reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be 
read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an 
adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if 
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian 
or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), 
Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information 
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, 
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association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not 
conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, 
records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions 
of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the 
matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation 
was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, 
in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the 
office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to 
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases 
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in 
civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, 
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted 
by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, 
fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office 
pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, 
statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence 
of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation in any form, 
was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the 
form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent 
search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or 
entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, 
deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar 
facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a 
religious organization. 
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(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a 
certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered 
a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other person authorized by 
the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act 
certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a 
reasonable time thereafter. 
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history 
contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions 
on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a 
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the 
content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each 
person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a 
public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of 
that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement 
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if 
the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with 
the property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of 
the statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence 
twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, 
lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon 
by the public or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness 
upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, 
statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject 
of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by 
the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by 
judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not 
be received as exhibits. 
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(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among 
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's 
associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, 
divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, 
or other similar fact of personal or family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a 
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs 
affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general history 
important to the community or State or nation in which located. 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among 
associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after 
a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging 
a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one 
year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when 
offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than 
impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of 
an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility. 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments 
as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential 
to the judgment, if the same would be provable by evidence of reputation. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in 
which the declarant: 
(a)(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying 
concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(a)(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
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(a)(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(a)(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then 
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(a)(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has 
been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable 
means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of lack 
of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the 
proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the witness 
from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(b)(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the 
same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in 
the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the 
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in 
interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination. 
(b)(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action or 
proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's 
death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(b)(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making 
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended 
to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by 
the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position 
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement 
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the 
accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the 
trustworthiness of the statement. 
(b)(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the 
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by 
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family 
history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge 
of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and 
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death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood, 
adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to 
be likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 805. Hearsay within hearsay. 
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each 
part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule 
provided in these rules. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 807. Other Exceptions. 
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or Rule 804 but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness is not excluded by the 
hearsay rule if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of 
a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is 
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests of 
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, 
a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it 
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the 
name and address of the declarant. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an 
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; 
and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. 
Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his 
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which 
the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect 
of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When 
a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an 
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only 
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the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the 
averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as specific denials 
of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the averments 
except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when 
he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial 
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of 
risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of 
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, 
release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has 
mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, 
the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had 
been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted 
when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no 
responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence 
inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
ConstitutioQ of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or 
by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible. 
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 (6) 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
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knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if 
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian 
or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), 
Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information 
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not 
conducted for profit. 
Regulations 
26 C.F.R. § 301,7805-1 
Sec. 301.7805-1 Rules and regulations. 
(a) Issuance. The Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, 
shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement 
of 
the Code (except where this authority is expressly given by the Code to 
any person other than an officer or employee of the Treasury 
Department), including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by 
reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue. 
(b) Retroactivity. The Commissioner, with the approval of the 
Secretary, may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any regulation or 
Treasury decision relating to the internal revenue laws shall be 
applied 
without retroactive effect. The Commissioner may prescribe the extent, 
if any, to which any ruling relating to the internal revenue laws, 
issued by or pursuant to authorization from him, shall be applied 
without retroactive effect. 
(c) Preparation and distribution of regulations, forms, stamps, and 
other matters. The Commissioner, under the direction of the Secretary, 
shall prepare and distribute all the instructions, regulations, 
directions, forms, blanks, stamps, and other matters pertaining to the 
assessment and collection of internal revenue. 
26 C.F.R. § 601.101 
Sec. 601.101 Introduction. 
Subpart A_General Procedural Rules 
Sec. 
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601.101 Introduction. 
601.102 Classification of taxes collected by the Internal Revenue 
Service. 
601.103 Summary of general tax procedure. 
601.104 Collection functions. 
601.105 Examination of returns and claims for refund, credit or 
abatement; determination of correct tax liability. 
601.106 Appeals functions. 
601.107 Cuminal investigation functions. 
601.108 Review of overpayments exceeding $200,000. 
601.109 Bankruptcy and receivership cases. 
Subpart B_Rulings and Other Specific Matters 
601.201 Rulings and determinations letters. 
601.202 Closing agreements. 
601.203 Offers in compromise. 
601.204 Changes in accounting periods and in methods of accounting. 
601.205 Tort claims. 
601.206 Certification required to obtain reduced foreign tax rates 
under 
income tax treaties. 
Subpart C [Reserved] 
Subpart D_Provisions Special to Certain Employment Taxes 
601.401 Employment taxes. 
Subpart E_Conference and Practice Requirements 
601.501 Scope of rules; definitions. 
601.502 Recognized representative. 
601.503 Requirements of power of attorney, signatures, fiduciaries and 
Commissioner's authority to substitute other requirements. 
601.504 Requirements for filing power of attorney. 
601.505 Revocation, change in representation and substitution or 
delegation of representative. 
601.506 Notices to be given to recognized representative; direct 
contact 
with taxpayer; delivery of a check drawn on the United States 
Treasury to recognized representative. 
601.507 Evidence required to substantiate facts alleged by a recognized 
representative. 
601.508 Dispute between recognized representatives of a taxpayer. 
601.509 Power of attorney not required in cases docketed in the Tax 
Court of the United States. 
Requirements for Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Activities 
601.521 Requirements for conference and representation in conference. 
601.522 Power of attorney. 
601.523 Tax information authorization. 
601.524 Execution and filing powers of attorney and tax information 
authorizations. 
601.525 Certification of copies of documents. 
601.526 Revocation of powers of attorney and tax information 
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authorizations. 
601.527 Other provisions applied to representation in alcohol, tobacco, 
and firearms activities. 
Subpart F_Rules, Regulations, and Forms 
601.601 Rules and regulations. 
601.602 Tax forms and instructions. 
Subpart G_Records (Note) 
601.702 Publication and public inspection. 
Subpart H_Tax Counseling for the Elderly 
601.801 Purpose and statutory authority. 
601.802 Cooperative agreements. 
601.803 Program operations and requirements. 
601. 804 Reimbursements. 
601.805 Miscellaneous administrative provisions. 
601.806 Solicitation of applications. 
Subpart I_Use of Penalty Mail m the Location and Recovery of Missing 
Children 
601.901 Missing children shown on penalty mail. 
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 552. 
Subpart I also issued under 39 U.S.C. 3220. 
Source: 32 FR 15990, Nov. 22, 1967, unless otherwise noted. 
(a) General. The Internal Revenue Service is a bureau of the 
Department of the Treasury under the immediate 
[[Page 6]] 
direction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Commissioner has 
general superintendence of the assessment and collection of all taxes 
imposed by any law providing internal revenue. The Internal Revenue 
Service is the agency by which these functions are performed. Within an 
internal revenue district the internal revenue laws are administered by 
a district director of internal revenue. The Director, Foreign 
Operations District, administers the internal revenue laws applicable 
to 
taxpayers residing or doing business abroad, foreign taxpayers deriving 
income from sources within the United States, and taxpayers who are 
required to withhold tax on certain payments to nonresident aliens and 
foreign corporations, provided the books and records of those taxpayers 
are located outside the United States. For purposes of these procedural 
rules any reference to a district director or a district office 
includes 
the Director, Foreign Operations District, or the District Office, 
Foreign Operations District, if appropriate. Generally, the procedural 
rules of the Service are based on the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and 
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the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and the procedural rules in this 
part 
apply to the taxes imposed by both Codes except to the extent 
specifically stated or where the procedure under one Code is 
incompatible with the procedure under the other Code. Reference to 
sections of the Code are references to the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954, unless otherwise expressly indicated. 
(b) Scope. This part sets forth the procedural rules of the 
Internal 
Revenue Service respecting all taxes administered by the Service, and 
supersedes the previously published statement (26 CFR (1949 ed., Part 
300-End) Parts 600 and 601) with respect to such procedural rules. 
Subpart A provides a descriptive statement of the general course and 
method by which the Service's functions are channeled and determined, 
insofar as such functions relate generally to the assessment, 
collectior, and enforcement of internal revenue taxes. Certain 
provisions special to particular taxes are separately described in 
Subpart D of this part. Conference and practice requirements of the 
Internal Fevenue Service are contained in Subpart E of this part. 
Specific matters not generally involved in the assessment, collection, 
and enforcement functions are separately described in Subpart B of this 
part. A description of the rule making functions of the Department of 
the Treasury with respect to internal revenue tax matters is contained 
in Subpart F of this part. Subpart G of this part relates to matters of 
official record in the Internal Revenue Service and the extent to which 
records and documents are subject to publication or open to public 
inspectior. This part does not contain a detailed discussion of the 
substantive provisions pertaining to any particular tax or the 
procedures relating thereto, and for such information it is necessary 
that reference be made to the applicable provisions of law and the 
regulations promulgated thereunder. The regulations relating to the 
taxes administered by the Service are contained in Title 26 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations. 
[38 FR 4955, Feb. 23, 1973 and 41 FR 20880, May 21, 1976, as amended at 
45 FR 7251, Feb. 1, 1980; 49 FR 36498, Sept. 18, 1984; T.D. 8685, 61 FR 
58008, Nov. 12, 1996] 
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Executive Order 10289 
U.S. NATIONAL Attn nvKs & RKCOKDS ADMINISTRATION 
www archives gov June 3 2005 
Executive Order 10289-Providing for the performance of certain functions of the President by the 
Secretary of the Treasury 
Source: The provisions of Executive Order 10289 of Sept 17, 1951, appear at 16 FR 9499, 3 CFR, 1949-
1953 Comp , p 787, unless otherwise noted 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1 of the act of August 8, 1950, 64 Stat 419 (Public Law 
673, 81st Congress), and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows 
1 The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby designated and empowered to perform the following-described 
functions of the President without the approval, ratification, or other action of the President 
(a) The authority vested in the President by section 1 of the act of August 1, 1914, c 223, 38 Stat 609, 
623, as amended (19 U S C 2), (1) to rearrange, by consolidation or otherwise, the several customs-
collection districts, (2) to discontinue ports of entry by abolishing the same and establishing others in their 
stead, and (3) to change from time to time the location of the headquarters in any customs-collection 
district as the needs of the service may require 
(b) The authority vested in the President by section 1 of the Anti-Smuggling Act of August 5, 1935, c 438, 
49 Stat 517 (19 U S C 1701), (1) to find and declare that at any place or within any area on the high seas 
adjacent to but outside customs waters any vessel or vessels hover or are being kept off the coast of the 
United States and that, by virtue of the presence of any such vessel or vessels at such place or within such 
area, the unlawful introduction or removal into or from the United States of any merchandise or person is 
being, or may be, occasioned, promoted, or threatened, (2) to find and declare that certain waters on the 
high seas are in such proximity to such vessel or vessels that such unlawful introduction or removal of 
merchandise or persons may be carried on by or to or from such vessel or vessels, and (3) to find and 
declare that, within any customs-enforcement area, the circumstances no longer exist which gave rise to 
the declaration of such area as a customs-enforcement area 
(c) The authority vested in the President by section 1 of the Act of August 26, 1985 Public Law 98-89 97 
Stat 510 (46 U S C 3101), to suspend the provisions of law requiring the inspection of foreign-built vessels 
admitted to American registry 
(d) The authority vested in the President by section 5 of the act of May 28, 1908, c 212, 35 Stat 425, as 
amended (46 U S C Appendix 104), to determine (as a prerequisite to the extension of reciprocal 
privileges by the Commissioner of Customs) that yachts used and employed exclusively as pleasure 
vessels and belonging to any resident of the United States are allowed to arrive at and depart from any 
foreign port and to cruise in the waters of such port without entering or clearing at the custom-house 
thereof and without the payment of any charges for entering or clearing, dues, duty per ton, tonnage taxes, 
or charges for cruising licenses 
(e) The authority vested in the President by section 2 of the act of March 24, 1908, c 96, 35 Stat 46 (46 
U S C Appendix 134), to name the hospital ships to which section 1 of the said act shall apply to indicate 
the time when the exemptions thereby provided for shall begin and end 
(f) The authority vested in the President by section 4223 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (46 U S C 
Appendix 141), (1) to declare that-upon satisfactory proof being given by the government of any foreign 
nation that no discriminating duties of tonnage or imposts are imposed or levied in the ports of such nation 
upon vessels wholly belonging to citizens of the United States, or upon the produce, manufactures, or 
merchandise imported in the same from the United States or from any foreign country-the foreign 
discriminating duties of tonnage and impost within the United States are suspended and discontinued, so 
far as respects the vessels of such foreign nation, and the produce, manufactures, or merchandise 
imported into the United States from such foreign nation, or from any other foreign country, and (2) to 
suspend in part the operation of section 4219 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (46 U S C Appendix 
121), and section IV, J, subsection 1 of the act of October 3 1913 c 16 38 Stat 195 as amended (46 
U S C Appendix 146), so that foreign vessels from a country imposing partial discriminating tonnage duties 
upon American vessels, or partial discriminating import duties upon American merchandise may enjoy in 
our ports the identical privileges which the same class of American vessels and merchandise may enjoy in 
such country Provided, that prior to the issuance of an order of the Secretary of the Treasury suspending 
and discontinuing (wholly or in part) discriminating tonnage duties imposts, and import duties within the 
United States, the Department of State shall obtain and furnish to the Secretary of the Treasury the proof 
required by the said section 4228, as amended as the basis for that order 
(g) The authority vested in the President by section 3650 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U S C 3650) to 
establish convenient collection districts (for the purpose of assessing, levying, and collecting the taxes 
provided by the internal revenue laws), and from time to time to alter such districts 
(h) The authority which is now vested in the President by section 2564 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code 
(26 U S C 2564 (b)), and which on and after January 1, 1955, will be vested in the President by section 
4735 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, to issue, in accordance with the provisions of the said 
section 2564 (b) or 4735 (b), as the case may be, orders providing for the registration and the imposition of 
a special tax upon all persons in the Canal Zone who produce, import compound, deal in, dispense, sell, 
distribute, or give away narcotic drugs. 
(i) The authority vested in the President by Section 5318 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (19 U.S.C. 
540), to employ suitable vessels other than Coast Guard cutters in the execution of laws providing for the 
collection of duties on imports and tonnage; 
[Para. 1 amended by EO 10583 of Dec. 18, 1954, 19 FR 8725, 3 CFR, 1954-1958 Comp., p. 232; EO 
10882 of July 18, 1960, 25 FR 6869, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 413; EO 11110 of June 4, 1963, 28 FR 
5605, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 770; EO 12608 of Sept. 9, 1987, 52 FR 34617, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 
245] 
2. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby designated and empowered to perform without the approval, 
ratification, or other action of the President the following functions which have heretofore, under the 
respective provisions of law cited, required the approval of the President in connection with their 
performance by the Secretary of the Treasury: 
(a) The authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by section 6 of the act of July 8, 1937, c. 444, 50 
Stat. 480 (5 U.S.C. 134c), to make rules and regulations necessary for the execution of the functions 
vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by the said act, as amended. 
(b) [Revoked] 
(c) [Revoked] 
(d) [Revoked] 
(e) The authority vested in the Secretary of the Treasury by section 1 of Title II of the act of June 15, 1917, 
c. 30, 40 Stat. 220 (50 U.S.C. 191), to make rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement 
of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States. 
(f) [Revoked] 
[Para. 2 amended by EO 11110 of June 4, 1963, 28 FR 5605, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 770; EO 11825 
of Dec. 31, 1974, 40 FR 1003, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp., p. 929; EO 12608 of Sept. 9, 1987, 52 FR 34617, 
3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 245] 
3. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster General are hereby designated and empowered 
jointly to prescribe without the approval of the President regulations, under section 1 of the act of July 8, 
1937, c. 444, 50 Stat. 479 (5 U.S.C. 134), governing the shipment of valuables by the executive 
departments, independent establishments, agencies, wholly-owned corporations, officers, and employees 
of the United States. 
(b) The Postmaster General is hereby designated and empowered to exercise without the approval, 
ratification, or other action of the President the authority vested in the President by section 504 (b) of title 
18 of the United States Code to approve regulations issued by the Secretary of the Treasury under the 
authority of the said section 504 (b) (relating to the printing, publishing, or importation, or the making or 
importation of the necessary plates for such printing or publishing, of postage stamps for philatelic 
purposes), and to approve any amendment or repeal of any of such regulations by the Secretary of the 
Treasury. 
[Para. 3 amended by EO 10583 of Dec. 18, 1954, 19 FR 8725, 3 CFR, 1954-1958 Comp., p. 232] 
4. As used in this order, the term "functions" embraces duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, or 
discretion, and the term "perform" may be construed to mean "exercise". 
5. All actions heretofore taken by the President in respect of the matters affected by this order and in force 
at the time of the issuance of this order, including regulations prescribed by the President in respect of such 
matters, shall, except as they may be inconsistent with the provisions of this order, remain in effect until 
amended, modified, or revoked pursuant to the authority conferred by this order. 
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Trial Court's Writ of Mandate and Judgment 
Tsilii^ 
TIMOTHY A. BODILY #6496 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666 
Attorney General 
Attorneys For Utah State Tax Commission 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
PO Box 140874 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0874 
Telephone: 801.366.0375 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP 2 1 200*1 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. Deputy Clerk 
AdOO 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
H. DOUGLAS GOFF and 
LISA GOFF, 
Respondent. 
WRIT OF MANDATE 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil Nos. 040911367 & 040911368 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Petitioner's Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Judgment came on for hearing 
before this Court on August 16, 2004 at 1:30 p.m. The Court having considered the Petitioner's 
written petition, affidavit, and statutory references, and Respondents' motion to dismiss, together 
with oral testimony, exhibits, and argument of the parties, and for good cause appearing 
therefore: 
HEREBY ORDERS that the Respondents' motion to dismiss is denied and a Writ of 
1 
Mandate and Judgment is hereby issued against the Respondents, H. Douglas Goff and Lisa 
Goff, as follows: 
1. Respondent H. Douglas Goff is ordered to file true, accurate and complete 1996, 
1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, and 2002 Utah Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms TC-40 series, 
with Petitioner on or before September 30, 2004, at 5:00 p.m. 
2. Respondent Lisa Goff is ordered to file true, accurate, and complete 1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 Utah Individual Income Tax Returns, Forms TC-40 series, with 
Petitioner on or before September 30, 2004, at 5:00 p.m. 
3. Each complete Utah Individual Income Tax Return shall include any applicable W-2, 
1099, and/or W-2P forms, and shall contain information from which the correctness of reported 
tax liability can be determined. 
4. All returns shall be filed with Dan Engh, Audit Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, 210 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84134. 
5. Based upon the affidavit of Timothy A. Bodily, an award as provided for in Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-707(1) (2003) is granted in favor of Petitioner and against Respondents in the 
following particulars: , 
a) Attorney Fees $ fvC/C/ 
b) Service Costs $ 24.00 
c) Filing Fees $ 155.00 
TOTAL 
6. Payment of awarded fees and costs shall be made on or before September 30, 2004, at 
5:00 p.m. to the attention of Timothy A. Bodily, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 
South, Fifth Floor, PO Box 140874, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0874. 
7. Failure to comply with this Writ of Mandate and Judgment will be considered 
contempt of this Court's order. 
8. Service of this Writ of Mandate and Judgment may be made by first class mail. 
DATED this i  v day of yA~7rS/ , 
HONORABLE GLENNiClWftSAKI 
Third Judicial District Court 
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USA v. Kuglin Docket 
Docket as of August 13, 2003 6 36 pm Web PACER (v2 3) 
U.S. District Court 
Western District of Tennessee (Memphis) 
CRIMINAL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 03-CR-20111-ALL 
USA v. Kuglin 
Filed: 03/26/03 
Dkt# in other court: None 
Case Assigned to: Judge Jon Phipps McCalla 
VERNICE B. KUGLIN 
defendant 
(1) 
Pending Counts: 
26:7201.F ATTEMPT TO EVADE OR 
DEFEAT TAX 
(1 " 6) 
Offense Level (opening): 4 
Terminated Counts: 
NONE 
Complaints: 
NONE 
U. S. Attorneys: 
Joseph C. Murphy, Jr., Esq. 
FTS 544-0854 
[COR LD NTC] 
Lowell H. Becraft, Jr. 
FAX 2050534-1821 
[COR LD NTC ret] 
Attorney at Law 
209 Lincoln Street 
Huntsville, AL 35801 
205-533-2535 
Vernice B. Kuglin 
[COR LD NTC] [PRO SE] 
200 Wagner Place 
#802 
Memphis, TN 38103 
901-522-1776 
Robert G. Bernhoft 
[COR LD NTC] 
207 East Buffalo Street 
Suite 600 
Milwaukee, WI 53202 
414-276-3333 
Disposition 
U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Federal Building 
167 N. Mam St. 
Ste. 800 
Memphis, TN 38103 
901-544-4231 
DOCKET PROCEEDINGS 
DATE # IMG DOCKET ENTRY 
3/26/03 1 INDICTMENT by USA Counts filed against Vernice 
Kuglm 
(1) count (s) 1-6 (pwm) [Entry date 03/27/03] 
3/26/03 2 ARREST Warrant issued for Vernice B. Kuglm by Mag 
Judge 
James H. Allen (pwm) [Entry date 03/27/03] 
4/1/03 3 ARREST Warrant returned executed as to Vernice B. 
Kuglm on 
4/1/03 (pwm) [Entry date 04/04/03] 
4/1/03 4 MINUTES: Before Mag Judge James H. Allen $10,000.00 
SECURETY Bond set for Vernice B. Kuglm, & ; 
arraignment 
set for 9:30 4/9/03 before Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo 
Type 
of hearing held: Initial Appearance - Court read the 
charges & advised of rights; DFt. retain counsel; BRA 
explained & signed; Bond set; Arraignment set. AUSA: 
C. 
Andre for J. Murphy Dft Atty: R. Pierce (LIMITED 
APPEARANCE) C/R: FTR (pwm) [Entry date 04/04/03] 
4/1/03 5 ^ ORDER setting conditions of release for Vernice B. 
Kuglm 
by Mag Judge James H. Allen (pwm) [Entry date 
04/04/03] 
4/1/03 
(pwm) 
SETTING LETTER ; arraignment set for 9:30 4/9/03 for 
Vernice B. Kuglm before Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo 
[Entry date 04/04/03] 
4/1/03 
Bail 
BOND Posted ( 10,000.00 SURETY) 00249841 by Liberty 
Bonds Vernice B. Kuglm (pwm) [Entry date 04/04/03] 
4/2/03 
(FILED 
NOTICE OF DELIVERANCE OF FOREIGN PASSPORT & RECEIPT 
UNDER SEAL) (document placed in vault) (pwm) 
[Entry date 04/04/03] [Edit date 04/04/03] 
4/9/03 9 
EXCLUDABLE 
Kuglm 
Type of 
to 
4/9/03 10 
EXCLUDABLE 
excludable 
MINUTES: Before Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo ON 
DELAY for period from 4/9/03 thru 4/29/03 as to dft , 
arraignment reset for 9:30 4/30/03 for Vernice B. 
before Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo As To: V. Kuglm 
hearing held: Arraignment - Dft requested continuance 
retain counsel. AUSA: T. Arvm for Murphy Dft Atty: R. 
Pierce C/R: FTR (pwm) [Entry date 04/10/03] 
ORDER ON CONTINUANCE AND SPECIFYING PERIOD OF 
DELAY by Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo period of 
time from 4/9/03 to 4/29/03 (cc: all counsel) (pwm) 
[Entry date 04/10/03] 
4/30/03 11 
Vernice 
Attorney 
Type 
MINUTES: Before Mag Judge Diane K. Vescovo dft 
B. Kuglm arraigned; Not Guilty plea entered; 
Lowell H. Becraft Jr. present; As To: V. Kuglm 
of hearing held: Arraignment - Dft was arraigned & 
7/8/03; 
formal reading of charges; Speedy Trial deadline 
Trial & report date to be set before Mag Judge. Trail 
Report Date notices handed to attys; Dft to remain on 
present bond. AUSA: D. Henry for Murphy Dft Atty: L. 
Becraft C/R: FTR (pwm) [Entry date 05/02/03] 
5/1/03 
Diane 
12 — ORDER ON ARRAIGNMENT AS TO DFT V. KUBLIN by Mag Judge 
K. Vescovo re [11-1] (cc: all counsel) (pwm) 
[Entry date 05/02/03] 
5/1/03 13 APPEARANCE for defendant Vernice B. Kuglm by Attorney 
Vernice B. Kuglm (pwm) [Entry date 05/02/03] 
5/20/03 14 
Vernice 
SETTING LETTER report date set for 9:00 5/23/03 for 
B. Kuglm (pwm) [Entry date 05/21/03] 
5/23/03 15 
held 
trial 
Vernice B. 
B. 
appear 
Dft 
MINUTES: Before Judge Jon P. McCalla Report date 
5/2/03. Dft on bond. Request for cont by dft. Cont 
to 7/7/03, report date set for 9:00 6/27/03 for 
Kuglm, ON EXCLUDABLE DELAY as to defendant Vernice 
Kuglm. Time excluded through 7/18/03. Reason for cont 
-additional time to prepare. Dft's counsel did not 
due to insufficient/untimely notice. AUSA: J. Murphy 
Atty: L. Becraft C/R: Brenda Parker (ehg) 
[Entry date 05/30/03] 
5/29/03 16 
EXCLUDABLE 
time 
ORDER ON CONTINUANCE AND SPECIFYING PERIOD OF 
DELAY by Judge Jon P. McCalla period of excludable 
from 6/13/03 to 7/18/03 (cc: all counsel) (ehg) 
[Entry date 05/30/03] 
5/30/03 17 ^ SETTING LETTER report date set for 9:00 6/27/03 for 
Vernice 
B. Kuglm (ehg) [Entry date 06/02/03] 
6/26/03 19 NOTICE; by plaintiff USA in response to a letter 
6/20/03, 
requesting discovery (ccp) [Entry date 07/02/03] 
6/27/03 18 -= CONSENT ORDER ON CRIMINAL by Judge Jon P. McCalla to 
continuance, and to exclusion of time as to Vernice B. 
Kuglm; case reset for report at 2:00pm on 7/24/03 
(cc: 
additonal 
Atty: L. 
you on 
all counsel) (ccp) [Entry date 07/01/03] 
6/27/03 20 UNOPPOSED MOTION by Vernice B. Kuglm to continue 
trial (ccp) 
[Entry date 07/03/03] 
6/27/03 21 MINUTES: Before Judge Jon P. McCalla report date set 
for 
2:00 7/24/03 for Vernice B. Kuglm; request for 
continuance by dft; continued trial to 8/4/03; time 
excluded through 8/15/03; reason for continuance 
time to prepare; AUSA: Colthurst for J. Murphy Dft 
Becraft C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp) [Entry date 07/03/03] 
7/2/03 22 NOTICE by plaintiff USA; additional documents are to 
be 
included with the documents previously delivered to 
6/26/03 (ccp) [Entry date 07/10/03] 
7/16/03 23 == SETTING LETTER report date set for 2:00 7/24/03 for 
Vernice 
B. Kuglm (ccp) [Entry date 07/17/03] 
7/24/03 24 BRIEF Concerning Trial Issues by defendant Vernice B. 
Kuglm (ccp) [Entry date 07/25/03] 
7/24/03 25 DEFENDANT KUGLIN'S REQUESTED VOIR DIRE by Vernice B. 
Kuglin 
proposed to the jury panel (ccp) [Entry date 07/25/03] 
7/24/03 39 MINUTES: Before Judge Jon P. McCalla ; jury trial set 
for 
8/4/03 for Vernice B. Kuglin AUSA: J. Murphy Dft 
Atty: L. Becraft C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp) 
[Entry date 08/12/03] 
7/24/03 40 MINUTES: Before Judge Jon P. McCalla ; jury trial set 
for 
8/4/03 for Vernice B. Kuglin AUSA: J. Murphy Dft 
Atty: L. Becraft C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp) 
[Entry date 08/13/03] 
7/28/03 26 RESPONSE by plaintiff USA; to prior discovery and the 
evidence in this case will also include copies of 
blank 
for 
Forms W-4 and the Deduction and Adjustment Worksheets 
1996-2001; (ccp) [Entry date 07/28/03] 
7/30/03 27 RULE 16 Discovery Response as to defendant Vernice B. 
Kuglin (jae) [Entry date 07/30/03] 
8/1/03 28 PROPOSED JURY Instructions by defendant Vernice B. 
Kuglin 
(ccp) [Entry date 08/04/03] 
8/4/03 -- PRO HAC VICE FEE PAID: in the amount of $ 100.00 
receipt 
# 081962 by Robert G. Bernhoft (ccp) [Entry date 
08/05/03] 
8/4/03 29 MOTION as to Vernice B. Kuglin for admission of 
attorney 
Robert G. Bernhoft to appear pro hac vice (ccp) 
[Entry date 08/05/03] 
8/4/03 30 AFFIDAVIT/Declaration of Attorney Robert G. Bernhoft 
(ccp) 
[Entry date 08/05/03] 
J/4/03 31 GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS by and through 
Terrell L. Harris (ccp) [Entry date 08/05/03] 
J/4/03 32 APPEARANCE for defendant Vernice B. Kuglin by Attorney 
Robert G. Bernhoft (ccp) [Entry date 08/05/03] 
8/4/03 33 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE; Robert G. Bernhoft to Appear 
pro 
hac vice as to Vernice Kuglin (ccp) [Entry date 
08/05/03] 
8/4/03 34 MINUTES: Before Judge Jon P. McCalla jury trial held 
on 
8/4/03; trial will resume on 8/5/03; AUSA: J. 
Murphy 
(ccp) 
Dft Atty: L. Becraft, R. Bernhoft C/R: Brenda Parker 
[Entry date 08/13/03] 
8/5/03 35 MINUTES: Before Judge Jon P. McCalla trial will 
resume on 
8/6/03 at 9:00 AUSA: J. Murphy Dft Atty: Becraft, 
Bernhoft C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp) [Entry date 
08/13/03] 
8/6/03 36 MINUTES: Before Judge Jon P. McCalla Trial resumes 
on 
8/7/03 at 9:00 AUSA: J. Murphy Dft Atty: Becraft, 
Bernhoft C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp) [Entry date 
08/13/03] 
J/7/03 37 MINUTES: Before Judge Jon P. McCalla trial resume 
J/8/03 
at 8:30 AUSA: J. Murphy Dft Atty: Becraft, Bernhoft 
C/R: 
Brenda Parker (ccp) [Entry date 08/13/03] 
8/8/03 38 MINUTES: Criminal Jury Trial; verdict: not guilty on 
cts 
1-6 as charged; jury deliberations resumed at 8:45 on 
day 5 
; Before Judge Jon P. McCalla AUSA: J. Murphy Dft 
Atty: 
Becraft, Bernhoft C/R: Brenda Parker (ccp) 
[Entry date 08/13/03] 
J/8/03 39 VERDICT as to Vernice B. Kuglm; find the defendant , 
Vernice B. Kuglm as to 1-6 not guilty (ccp) 
[Entry date 08/13/03] 
END OF DOCKET: 2:03cr20111-0 
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1 unclear as to whether -- whether he realized that our motion to 
2 dismiss is for both writs of mandate which were filed one against 
3 my wife, one against me. 
4 THE COURT: Well, this is a consolidated action. 
5 MR. GOFF: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: I've done both -- I'm hearing both cases, 
7 and that includes by definition yours and your wife's motions. 
8 Do you have any other understanding than that, Mr. Bodily9 
9 MR. BODILY: No, your Honor. I--
10 THE COURT: All right. 
11 MR. BODILY: —intended drafting the response to address 
12 both; I thought I had. 
13 THE COURT: My cursory reading of your response 
14 indicates that. I don't think that's an issue, Mr. Goff. 
15 MR. GOFF: Okay. Then also additionally, in prior 
16 proceedings there's been an attempt to cast us as taxpayers We 
17 want to reiterate that our position is that that -- that is not 
18 an issue that has been affirmatively established in any record, 
19 either here before the Court or elsewhere. Then I also have a --
20 well, that would be it, your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: All right, or want of better identification 
22 you're the respondents, as far as I'm concerned, and I guess what 
23 your position is you have not yet been judged a taxpayer by any 
24 competent Court, and I don't care. I can call you respondent I 
25 can call you Mr. Goff. It doesn't matter to me, so I understand 
1 submitted that my only earnings have been at -- through 
2 Bonneville High School, my activities there, my teaching. 
3 Q. So are you a teacher, then, for the -- is it the 
4 Bonneville High School? 
5 A. Yes, I am. 
6 Q. Is that located in Utah7 
7 A. Yes, it is. 
8 Q. What do you get paid for your services? 
9 A. I'm compensated — it varies per year. 
10 Q. What do you receive presently on an annual basis? 
11 MR. GOFF: Your Honor, objection. Ms. Goff has issued 
12 a previous -- a previous statement that she has -- that she has 
13 sworn to, and she -- I believe she's entitled to review her 
14 statement before she offers her answer. 
15 THE COURT: No, she's not. If she wanted to do that 
16 in preparation for her testimony, that's fine. This is an 
17 examination at this time and objection overruled. You may answer 
18 the -- you may answer. 
19 THE WITNESS: Would you restate the question, please7 
20 Q. BY MR. BODILY: What do you presently receive on an 
21 annual basis in compensation for your services to the Bonneville 
22 High School? 
23 A. If you're asking about my income -- and that's been 
24 my -- one of my questions is whether that income is indeed a 
25 taxable income, but I receive a compensation of around 40 plus 
-19-
1 thousand dollars. 
2 Q. Okay. Do you know what you would have received in 
3 compensation in 1996? 
4 A. No, I don't know. I don't recall. 
5 Q. Would it be -- if I were to give you the number $33,802 
6 would that sound approximately correct? 
7 A. I suppose. That would again, be one of my questions, 
8 though, whether that would be a taxable income That's one of 
9 the things that we've been seeking information about 
10 Q. Right, but if I gave you the figure of $33,802 in 
11 compensation, was that approximately what you received in 1996 
12 for your services to Bonneville High School? 
13 A. Approximately. 
14 Q. Do you know for 1997 what you would have received? 
15 MR. GOFF: Your Honor, I object— 
16 THE WITNESS: No, I don't. 
17 MR. GOFF: I object to these questions. Mrs Goff has 
18 rights under the -- under the Utah Constitution and the Federal 
19 Constitution not to -- not to incriminate herself These 
20 questions may tend to lead to the self incrimination on future 
21 charges, and I -- and she has not been advised by the Court of 
22 these rights. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Goff, you are representing yourself 
24 You're not representing her. If she's got any objections she can 
25 make the objections. Now that you've told her what objections to 
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1 THE COURT: Are you the keeper of the records? 
2 THE WITNESS: I am the keeper of the records. 
3 THE COURT: All right. 
4 Q. BY MR. BODILY: Does this reflect the information 
5 transmitted from the Internal Revenue Service? 
6 A, Yes, it does. 
7 Q. Is that made at the time the commission receives that 
8 information? 
9 A. Pardon me? 
10 Q. Is it made at the same time the commission receives the 
11 information from the Internal Revenue Service? 
12 A. Yes, it is. Yes. 
13 MR. BODILY: I would move that this be admitted. 
14 THE COURT: Any objections, Mr. Goff? 
15 MR. GOFF: If you could delay the admission until after 
16 my cross examination of Ms. Furniss. Otherwise, yes, I do 
17 object. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. State your objection. 
19 MR. GOFF: I believe — I believe that the evidence from 
20 my cross examination, but I would object on the grounds that 
21 these records come from the IRS. I would want to explore whether 
22 or not they came from the IRS under seal and to the tax 
23 commission, and also discover if Ms Furniss has any knowledge of 
24 someone submitting that information to the IRS prior I believe 
25 these records -- the records that Mr. Bodily is referring are 
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12 through 15? 
MR. BODILY: Let's just keep the packet as it is and not 
refer to 12 through 15. 
THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. Mr. — first of all, 
Lisa Goff, any questions of Ms. Furniss? 
MS. GOFF: I would request that Mr. Goff go first and I 
could follow if necessary. 
THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Goff, go ahead. 
MR. GOFF: Your Honor, if I could just have a moment to 
confer with opposing Counsel. 
THE COURT: Yes. ! 
(Mr. Goff confers with Mr. Bodily) 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GOFF: 
Q. Hello, Ms. Furniss. It's been awhile. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Ms. Furniss, does the commission disclose these records 
to anyone that comes and asks for them? 
A. No, not just anyone. There are authorized individuals 
who can receive this information. 
Q. Okay. So it's a limited list and not -- they're not 
available to the public at large? 
A. No. 
Q. So this is your statement? You swear to it9 ' 
A. It is. 
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1 Q. Okay. Now referring to the exhibits in the affidavit, 
2 are these normal type records that the commission uses for -- in 
3 petitions for writs of mandates in matters such as this7 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Okay. Where does the information that makes up these 
6 records come from? 
7 A. This is transmitted to the tax commission from the 
8 Internal Revenue Service under our exchange and information 
9 agreement. 
10 Q. Transmitted? Does that indicate that they are -- you 
11 receive through electronically? 
12 A. No, we receive it on extract. It's--
13 Q. (Inaudible). 
14 A. Right, that is correct. It's on magnetic media. 
15 Q. Okay. With respect to these records which you say come 
16 from the IRS, how do you know that the IRS is the source of 
17 those? 
18 A. By the transmittals that come to me certifying that it's 
19 come directly from their agency. 
20 Q. Okay. So there is a certification to the fact that the 
21 information came -- that comes on a tape that comes from the IRS9 
22 A. There is a transmittal that comes with it that I have to 
23 acknowledge that we received the data and that all the extracts 
24 are there. 
25 Q. Okay. Who in the Internal Revenue Service sent this 
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1 information as it pertains to me and to Mrs. Goff? 
2 A. This would have come out of Martmsburg Computing 
3 Center. As far as an individual, it may come from different 
4 individuals, but it comes out of Martmsburg Computing Center. 
5 Q. Okay. Can you identify those individuals, please? 
6 A. No, I cannot. 
7 Q. Okay. So the record -- the records themselves, has 
8 anyone certified to the accuracy and the truth of those records9 
9 A. Not in a formal certification. The information is 
10 gathered by the Internal Revenue Service, put in an extract form 
11 and sent to the different state agencies for state tax 
12 administration. This is done under 6103(d) of the Internal 
13 Revenue Code, and we also have formal agreements with the IRS 
14 that the data is accurate. It's our assumption that what has 
15 been sent is accurate. 
16 Q. It's assumed to be accurate? 
17 A. It is presumed to be accurate. 
18 Q. That presumption is based on? 
19 A. On our exchange agreement with the Internal Revenue 
20 Service. 
21 Q. Is it possible for those records to be inaccurate7 
22 A. I have no personal knowledge of that. 
23 Q. But it's possible? 
24 A. I do not know that. 
25 Q. Did the records come to you with any sort of affidavit 
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1 attesting to the truth of the records? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Now with respect to your affidavit -- this one -- did 
4 you choose the words in your affidavit very carefully? 
5 A. I believe it's basically standard language for an 
6 affidavit of this type. It was not specific to this case, but 
7 it's a general statement that I attest to. 
8 Q. Okay. By signing that those words become your words and 
9 you testify -- and you know those statements to be accurate? 
10 A. I do. 
11 Q. Now with respect to the records in general that you 
12 received you from the IRS, have you ever requested authentication 
13 from the IRS of any of those documents -- of those records or 
14 documents? 
15 A. Of these individual ones? 
16 Q. Generally. 
17 A. Just generally? When — we at times on a case-by-case 
18 basis will request certified records in addition to these records 
19 when we are going into a criminal proceeding because that's 
20 required by the Court in that particular setting. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. These here, this is as correct as the data sent to the 
23 IRS. They don't manipulate the data. The information has been 
24 sent to them by the banks, by trusts, by Social Security 
25 Administration, and they put that data together for this extract. 
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1 Q. So the IRS is not the originator of that information? 
2 A. They are not the originator of the W-2 information. The 
3 W-2 information is first sent to Social Security Administration, 
4 who accounts for the wages of those individuals for Social 
5 Security purposes. They then create the database and send it to 
6 the IRS. 1099s, K-ls, that type of thing is sent directly to the 
7 IRS. 
8 Q. Okay, sent to the IRS and they forward it on to you? 
9 A. That is correct. 
10 Q. Who sends that information to the IRS? 
11 A. Well, it depends on what the documents are. You've got 
12 1099s — K-ls may come from corporations or partnerships, 1099s 
13 may come from banks, contractors, whoever is required to report 
14 that information to the IRS will send it directly to them. W-2 
15 information, however, is first sent to Social Security and then 
16 sent on to the Internal Revenue Service. 
17 MR. GOFF: Your Honor, I'd like these marked as exhibits 
18 for identification. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. How many do you have? 
20 MR. GOFF: Two. I also have copies for Mr. Bodily. 
21 THE COURT: And for the Court? And for the Court? 
22 MR. GOFF: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: Which is which? 
24 COURT CLERK: The miscellaneous income is 2, D-2. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 any findings of fact and conclusions of law on— 
2 MR. GOFF: Well, I withdraw that question, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. Objection sustained. 
4 Q. BY MR. GOFF: Have you ever had occasion to prepare a 
5 W-2 for myself -- for me? 
6 MR. BODILY: Same objection, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Sustained. Beyond the scope. 
8 Q. BY MR. GOFF: Are you custodian of the Internal Revenue 
9 Service records? 
10 A. I'm custodian of the State Tax Commission records. 
11 Q. That's not my question, ma'am. Are you custodian of the 
12 Internal Revenue Service records? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. That these came from, okay. Are you the person who made 
15 the entries to the Internal Revenue Service's records which these 
1 6 came from? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Do you have the capacity to verify these records? 
19 A. Yes. 
2 0 Q. How does that happen? 
21 A. I can do it several ways. I can -- we have this median 
22 in different forms that I can match one against the other. I can 
23 also request this information on paper from the IRS on a case-by-
24 case basis which would verify what's already here. 
25 Q. Okay. Do you have the capacity to verify these records 
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1 as IRS -- do you have the capacity to verify the records that 
2 came from the IRS which these records reflect? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Have you done so? 
5 A. No. 
6 MR. GOFF: Your Honor, I object -- I move to strike this 
7 Exhibit P-l in that there is — one moment, your Honor. One more 
8 question, if I may. 
9 Q. BY MR. GOFF: What personal knowledge do you have that 
10 the income as reported on those records was received by Mrs. Goff 
11 or myself? 
12 A. This information was reported to the Internal Revenue 
13 Service. How you received it I don't have personal knowledge of. 
14 Q. Okay. You have no personal knowledge of how we may have 
15 received that income. Do you have any personal knowledge that we 
16 did receive that income? 
17 A. Just by the fact that it was reported under your name to 
18 the Internal Revenue Service. 
19 Q. Okay. So then you were relying on the -- what you have 
20 read in these reports rather than any -- any personal experience 
21 or personal knowledge? 
22 MR. BODILY: Objection, your Honor. She hasn't 
23 testified she relied on anything. She's identified the 
24 documents. We're going to present (inaudible). 
25 MR. GOFF: Your Honor, I'm asking. I'm asking her if 
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1 she -- what the basis of her -- of her knowledge is, whether 
2 it's — whether it's based on personal firsthand knowledge or 
3 based on a reading of the records. 
4 THE COURT: Ask her. 
5 THE WITNESS: It would be based on the reading of the 
6 records. 
7 Q. BY MR. GOFF: Not on any personal firsthand knowledge? 
8 A. That's not in my scope of work at my job. It's not in 
9 my scope of work. I would not be an investigator or whatnot to 
10 show personal knowledge. 
11 Q. Is that a yes or a no? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. No personal— 
14 A. No personal knowledge. 
15 MR. GOFF: Your Honor, then, you know, for that reason 
16 since Ms. Furniss has no personal knowledge of the truth of the 
17 matter contained in the records, I move that we strike Exhibit 
18 P-l and also Ms. Furniss' testimony. 
19 THE COURT: Her testimony will remain. As to the 
20 striking of P-l, what is your response, Mr. Bodily? 
21 MR. BODILY: Your Honor, we've had her testify and 
22 identify that these are true and correct documents and tax 
23 commission records, and so they're coming under the exception 
24 to the hearsay rule, so obviously she won't have any personal 
25 knowledge as to anything that's on there. It's not required, 
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1 who in turn puts together a larger file with other information 
2 returns and sends that to the tax commission on an annual basis. 
3 Q. So that would generally reflected information submitted 
4 by the Weber County School District? 
5 A. That is correct. 
6 MR. BODILY: Your Honor, I have no other questions at 
7 this point. I would submit to the Court that we are submitting 
8 these documents reflecting commission records, and that would be 
9 admissible under 803-6 or 803-8, other records -- the business 
10 records exception for the purposes of showing the commission's 
11 records. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. Any further argument, Mr. Goff? 
13 MR. GOFF: A couple questions of Ms. Furniss. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. GOFF: Okay. 
16 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. GOFF: 
18 Q. Now you testified that the -- well, in the specific case 
19 of the Weber County School District W-2 that was prepared by the 
20 school district? 
21 A. As far as I'm aware, yes. 
22 Q. Okay. So those are not documents prepared by the tax 
23 commission or the IRS but by yet another party? 
24 A. The W-2? Are you talking about the W-2 from Weber 
25 County? 
-55-
1 Q. Yes. 
2 A. That--
3 Q. Well, all of the W-2's from Weber County School 
4 District. All of the W-2's in your records. 
5 A. The W-2's would have been prepared by the respective 
6 employers and then reported to the respective agencies as 
7 required by law. 
8 Q. So we have yet another — another party involved? 
9 A. Well, the only way IRS or Social Security received that 
10 information is what's reported to them. They don't prepare for 
11 employers. 
12 Q. Okay. Now you state -- you testified earlier that 
13 the records from the IRS did not come to you under seal. Did 
14 these -- these reports — do you have any knowledge of these 
15 reports from the employers or other parties, and other parties 
16 with respect to the 1099s that are in these records, did any of 
17 those records — or did the origin of any of that reporting come 
18 under seal from employers and payers? 
19 A. It's not a requirement. Under the law they're required 
20 to file, but they're not required to send them in under seal. 
21 Q. So is that a yes or a no that they— 
22 A. Then the answer would be no. 
23 MR. GOFF: Okay. Your Honor, I renew my motion --
24 motion to strike. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. GOFF: The grounds— 
2 THE COURT: You're submitting -- no, you're submitting 
3 it now? I understand your grounds. Motion to strike P-l is 
4 denied. The Court is satisfied that this is under the business 
5 records exception as well as the public documents exception. 
6 Furthermore, the added testimony of Ms. Furniss as to the 
7 procedures and the reliance upon the -- on the federal code as 
8 to the exchange information and the manner in which it was 
9 transferred, so the Court overrules the objection P-l is again 
10 admitted. 
11 MR. GOFF: Your Honor, can I have a few moments here, 
12 your Honor? 
13 THE COURT: Do you have any more questions for this 
14 witness? 
15 MR. GOFF: I'm trying to evaluate whether she can -- I 
16 have a letter here that I -- I only have this -- our own copy of 
17 this letter that I would like to have marked. 
18 MR. BODILY: I'd like to see it first, your Honor, if I 
19 may. 
2 0 THE COURT: Sure. 
21 (Mr. Bodily examines letter) 
22 MR. BODILY: Your Honor, it's a letter addressed to me 
23 I don't see what this witness could testify to about contents in 
24 the letter. 
25 THE COURT: Unfortunately, Mr. Bodily, he can mark 
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1 for him. 
2 THE COURT: I stand corrected. Feature Films for 
3 Families? 
4 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: Then that's cross referenced by the numbers 
6 and then the computer spits out the numbers as matching and 
7 Douglas Goff's name comes up with these payments. 
8 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: That's for the purpose of unemployment 
10 compensation in the event that he is entitled to it. 
11 THE WITNESS: Correct. 
12 THE COURT: Any objections, Mr. Goff? 
13 MR. GOFF: Yes, your Honor There's no certification 
14 here from -- of -- from the parties who reported this information 
15 to Workforce Services. They--
16 THE COURT: At least you're consistent. That's the same 
17 objection you made on the other one and it has a ring of 
18 authenticity of it. However, I'm going to overrule the objection 
19 based upon the certifications and based upon the 804 business 
20 records, as well as the public records. The Court is going to 
21 allow P-5 to be received, but as I said, you're consistent and 
22 that's the same objection you made before and that's an arguable 
23 one. 
24 (Exhibit No. P-5 received into evidence) 
25 Q. BY MR. BODILY: Mr. Engh, if I could have you turn 
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1 MR. GOFF: Yes, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 CROSS EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. GOFF: 
5 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Engh. 
6 A. Good afternoon. 
7 MR. GOFF: Do we have Mr. Engh's affidavit into 
8 evidence? 
9 MR. BODILY: His affidavit, I did not admit into 
10 evidence at this time. 
11 MR. GOFF: Your Honor, I'd like these marked. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. GOFF: Or one document. I have a copy for Counsel. 
14 THE COURT: A copy for me? 
15 MR. GOFF: May I approach? 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you. This is what, Janef 
17 COURT CLERK: D-6. 
18 THE COURT: D-6? 
19 COURT CLERK: Uh-huh. 
20 COURT CLERK: Here's a copy of D-4. 
21 THE COURT: Which we haven't received. 
22 COURT CLERK: Which we haven't received. 
23 THE COURT: It hasn't been offered. 
24 Q. BY MR. GOFF: Mr. Engh, you had indicated in your 
25 testimony that (inaudible) reference to returns of taxpayers 
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1 hadn't been filed. Has there been -- has there been a 
2 determination that I'm a taxpayer, a formal determination by the 
3 commission? 
4 A. Through judicial proceedings, no. 
5 Q. Has there been for Mrs. Goff? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Now you're relying on these same records that 
8 Ms. Furniss testified -- testified earlier to? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. In Exhibit P-l? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Now your — may I approach the witness? 
13 THE COURT: Yes. 
14 Q. BY MR. GOFF: I just handed to you Exhibit -- is that D-
15 6 or D-7? 
16 THE COURT: D-6. 
17 Q. BY MR. GOFF: D-6 for identification and ask you what is 
18 that? 
19 A. It's an affidavit that I signed. 
20 Q. That you signed? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. The exhibits or the attachments thereto, are they the 
23 same as the exhibits that are attached to P-l? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Which I've earlier referred to as to the records or 
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1 THE COURT: D-6 is received, but with the observation of 
2 the Court that while P-1 was referred to in its entirety as 
3 records contained in D-6, only part of the records of P-1 are 
4 contained. The last three or four pages of P-1 are not contained 
5 in D-6. Plus the last page on D-6 is something that is not 
6 included in P-1, or am I mistaken, Mr. Engh? 
7 THE WITNESS: It's not included on P-1. 
8 MR. GOFF: I believe it is included, your Honor, m P-5. 
9 THE COURT: Well, it may or may not, but I'm just 
10 correcting the record when you said that these are the same as 
11 contained in P-1. For the most part they are. For the most part 
12 they are those that have been referenced, but P-1 has other pages 
13 into it that are not included in D-6. Go ahead. So D-6 is in 
14 with that observation. 
15 (Exhibit No. D-6 received into evidence) 
16 MR. GOFF: Thank you, your Honor. 
17 Q. BY MR. GOFF: Calling your attention to the first page 
18 in your affidavit, you state that you're legally competent to 
19 offer the following testimony. 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Okay. What is your understanding of what it means to be 
22 legally competent to offer testimony? 
23 A. A person over 21, is not certified insane. 
24 Q. Have you ever been certified insane? 
25 A. No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
that 
witn 
I'll 
this 
rs not just a general statement. 
SSS. SO 
MR. 
THE 
You'll do 
are you talking the stand now? All 
GOFF: 
COURT: 
help you out a 
MR. 
THE 
matter? 
MR. 
THE 
you possibly 
MR. 
Bodily, who -
tele] 
firs 
that 
upon 
this 
GOFF: 
COURT: 
GOFF: 
COURT: 
Thank you. 
You're already under oath. 
little bit. State your name 
Harvey Douglas Goff, Jr. 
You are the --
Yes, I am, your 
All right. As 
can, tell me your side 
GOFF: 
-- that 
shone number of 
thand knowledge 
attachments to 
THE COURT: 
your testimony 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
GOFF: 
COURT: 
BODILY 
COURT: 
(Exhibit D-
MR. 
request 
GOFF: 
On August 4th we 
that as a 
right. 
Take the 
-85-
stand. 
for the record. 
one of the respondents m 
Honor. 
succinctly and as directly as 
of what's happening here. 
mailed a letter to Tim 
-- wherein we asked for the 
the person -- person who has 
of the truth of the matters 
Daniel Engh's affidavit. 
name, add] 
personal 
contained 
So you move for the admission of D-4 
that your wrote 
We — I do. 
Any objections, 
No objection. 
and sent it? 
Mr. Bodily? 
D-4 is received. 
-4 received into evidence) 
I might add that -- that we 
knowing that we intended to object 
:ess and 
or 
therein 
based 
made -- we made 
to Mr. -- to the 
-86-
1 presentation of what the tax commission claims of -- claims to be 
2 the records of our -- of our income in that--
3 THE COURT: As I said— 
4 MR. GOFF: That there's no one with firsthand knowledge 
5 We've requested pursuant to Rule 803, I believe paragraph 24, the 
6 name, address and telephone number of the person who has personal 
7 or firsthand knowledge of the truth of the matters contained in 
8 the attachments to the exhibit. 
9 Mr. Bodily responded with the -- on Wednesday of last 
10 week with an affidavit from Dolores Furniss, which is Exhibit P-1 
11 in this matter. Ms. Furniss has declared that she does not have 
12 firsthand knowledge of the truth of the matters contained in 
13 those attachments -- or contained in P-1. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. As I said before, in both of your 
15 arguments to keep out documents you were consistent in that your 
16 position was there was no -- and I will use legal terms -- there 
17 was a lack of foundation as to the authenticity of the proffered 
18 statements and the information. The Court has already ruled, D-4 
19 is in as further evidence of your objections. What else do we 
2 0 have? 
21 MR. GOFF: That's it for me, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Ms. Goff, do you wish to 
23 testify? 
2 4 MS. GOFF: No, I do not. 
25 THE COURT: All right. You may call your next witness, 
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1 just because she stated her name and her employment does not make 
2 her hostile, sir. 
3 MR. GOFF: Thank you, your Honor. I'll wait. 
4 Q. BY MR. GOFF: Is one of your duties to respond to the 
5 questions that people ask about their tax status? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Back in April did you receive a letter from my wife and 
8 I — or my wife and me titled a notice access and evidentiary 
9 hearing request? 
10 A. I did. 
11 Q. The subpoena you were served told you to bring that 
12 letter with you. Do you have the letter? 
13 A. I have a copy of it. 
14 MR. GOFF: Okay. Your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 MR. GOFF: Exhibit D-7 is a copy -- an exact copy of 
17 what we sent to Ms. Salter, with the provision that at the tail 
18 end of the exhibit there are pages that show certified mail 
19 receipts, a receipt from the--
2 0 MR. BODILY: Your Honor--
21 MR. GOFF: —post office and so forth, and if we could 
22 use D-7. 
23 THE COURT: What's the relevance of all this 
24 information? 
25 MR. GOFF: I intend to show relevance here. 
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1 THE COURT: Well, I want to know before it even gets 
2 admitted. What are you using this for7 
3 MR. GOFF: Well, if -- if the Court is to rule on -- on 
4 our motion to dismiss, this is the basis. 
5 THE COURT: Well, tell me what — tell me what you 
6 use — what you're using this for and how is Ms. Salter going to 
7 be aiding me in the use of D-7 if it's admitted? 
8 MR. GOFF: I haven't asked — I haven't asked for its 
9 admission yet, your Honor. I'm asking that— 
10 THE COURT: I'm asking you. I'm trying to short circuit 
11 this. I'm asking you, what are you using D-7 for9 What is D-79 
12 There's a letter to Ms. Salter and to another You're asking for 
13 certain things. What is it that you're asking for and how does 
14 that apply to this hearing today? 
15 MR. GOFF: In this letter we ask — we ask for specific 
16 con -- findings of fact and conclusions of law as to our status, 
17 whether or not we have the status of taxpayer, whether or not we 
18 are persons liable for income tax. We state — we state therein 
19 that if and when the Utah State Tax Commission personnel can 
20 find -- show us with findings of fact and conclusions of law that 
21 we are persons liable to file a state tax return, we will file 
22 whatever return is required by law for us to file. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. So you're asking this information 
24 from Ms. Salter and others in the tax commission? 
25 MR. GOFF: Yes, sir. 
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1 MR. BODILY: Your Honor, I don't see any relevance. I 
2 do have a concern here that if he's — he appears to try to be 
3 pleading an issue here as to -- as to his income and his 
4 liability and so forth, and then he takes the Fifth Amendment on 
5 the stand, so if he's going to inquire or get into this issue and 
6 proffer evidence and so forth, then I think -- I think arguably 
7 he's waiving -- if not already his Fifth Amendment objections to 
8 that particular issue. 
9 THE COURT: You can make your argument as you want. 
10 Ms. Salter, you may have received this. Did you ever answer it9 
11 THE WITNESS: I did not. 
12 THE COURT: You did not. Okay. So that was what you 
13 wanted. She didn't answer it. So there -- what your position is 
14 that without her answering it there is no findings or 
15 conclusions, using your words, to indicate that you're liable in 
16 any way, correct? Is that your position? And then you can argue 
17 that. 
18 MR. GOFF: I'd like to proffer it into evidence, too. 
19 THE COURT: You've proffered it. I'm not receiving it. 
20 D-7 is not received as being irrelevant here. You can argue it 
21 at the end of the case, Mr. Goff, and I understand what your 
22 argument is. You've said it a number of times, and I'm not that 
23 dense that it doesn't get it, but you can argue it at the correct 
24 time. 
25 MR. GOFF: Thank you. 
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1 taxes subject to the state federal piggybacking arrangements." 
2 I'm reading from page 3 if you want to follow along there, your 
3 Honor. 
4 The -- authorized by 31-CFR part 215, or if we are 
5 required to collect any of the taxes. Therefore, we need 
6 Internal Revenue Service and Utah State Tax Commission's 
7 assistance in determining if we are liable for any of the -- any 
8 given tax imposed on subtitles (a) and (c) of the Internal 
9 Revenue Code, or if we are required to collect imposed -- taxes 
10 imposed by subtitles (a) and (c) and what qualified state income 
11 tax we are personally liable for or are required to collect." 
12 Your Honor, we've asked the commission for its help to 
13 produce -- well, for its help in first determining if we are 
14 required to file these returns, and -- and if we are, to give us 
15 the knowledge base that would enable them to -- as Mr Bodily 
16 asked in the petition — in their original petition that would 
17 enable us to file true, correct and accurate returns for those 
18 years. What we've received from the tax commission is silence. 
19 Dismissing the commission's petition is proper as an 
20 equitable remedy m that -- in that we've -- we recognize a lack 
21 of knowledge on our part. 
22 We've sought -- we've sought to discover how the income 
23 tax laws apply to us, and we've asked the commission to provide 
24 their findings of fact and conclusions of law to those questions 
25 and specifically one to determine whether we come within the 
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1 confines within the income tax laws. Our request pertains to 
2 1992 through 2002 for those years. 
3 Our request meets all six requirements of a request for 
4 agency action as outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act, 
5 Utah Code 63-46-3, paragraph 3, subparagraph (a). 
6 Now the commission as the agency responsible to 
7 administer and supervise the tax laws of the state has a duty to 
8 notify us of their action. This is a request for agency action 
9 we — that we have submitted, or it -- it qualifies to be such 
10 but not titled as such. They have a duty to notify us pursuant 
11 to Utah Code Annotated 63-46-3, paragraph 3, subparagraph (d). 
12 You could also take a look at— 
13 THE COURT: So is your argument based upon the fact that 
14 they didn't give you this information that I ought to dismiss 
15 this petition today? Is that — is that the crux of your 
16 argument? 
17 MR. GOFF: Well, your Honor, until they do, we lack the 
18 capacity to comply with the -- with an order to -- to make the 
19 returns, if such would be your order, and precisely because we're 
20 going to be asked to sign a perjured jurat on that return or on 
21 those returns. 
22 We're signing to the best of our knowledge and belief 
23 that that -- and we would be signing to the best -- that to the 
24 best of our knowledge and belief that — that is a true and 
25 accurate return. 
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1 But what the tax commission desires from us certainly is 
2 not to the best of our knowledge and belief. Therefore we -- we 
3 depend on their answer, and they -- well, I don't know if I can 
4 say they withheld it from us. They have not replied. They've 
5 been silent up to this point. 
6 That damages us. It gives us injury because we --
7 they're asking us to do something we don't know how to do. We 
8 don't know what to do. 
9 THE COURT: You don't know how to file a tax return and 
10 you don't know what a tax return is supposed to be; is that what 
11 you're telling me? 
12 MR. GOFF: No. No. 
13 THE COURT: You cannot go to a tax accountant to find 
14 out that? You could not go to a tax attorney to help you with 
15 these questions? Your basis for dismissal is -- let me see if I 
16 can get this right -- those requests that you proffered in D-7 
17 have never been answered to your satisfaction, therefore I ought 
18 to equitably dismiss this action. 
19 MR. GOFF: Your Honor, they have never been answered. 
2 0 THE COURT: I know, and that's — and that's your — 
21 that's your basis for dismissal is that you didn't ever receive 
22 this information; is that -- is that the basis for your -- one of 
23 the bases for your dismissal? 
24 MR. GOFF: That's one of them. 
25 THE COURT: All right, your second basis is that neither 
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1 MR. BODILY: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. BODILY: It was admitted, I would it pointed out. 
4 So you do have this evidence that I believe would fall under any 
5 one of those exceptions, and the Court has sufficient authority 
6 to allow those -- and you did grant those and allow those in. 
7 I would add that obviously they've had notice of what we 
8 were going to do here. We submitted the affidavits some time ago 
9 when we filed our response, and they have presented no other 
10 evidence to whether that's inaccurate or not. So the only thing 
11 you really have are those documents before you and their refusal 
12 to answer on questions of the same. 
13 THE COURT: What consideration, if any, does the Court 
14 need to give to the fact that D-7, the letter requesting all that 
15 information, was not answered? It seems to me that Mr. Goff is 
16 saying, "If you gave me the right information I would--" meaning 
17 me, Mr. Goff —"will make the determination if I needed to file 
18 or not. You didn't give me that information, therefore we ought 
19 move to dismiss this matter." Are we talking apples and oranges 
20 on the different ways the tax commission can proceed? 
21 MR. BODILY: Yes, absolutely. Mr. and Mrs. Goff 
22 apparently have their own understanding of what their 
23 requirements are to file; we have ours. We provided our 
24 information showing the income and the laws that we rely on, and 
25 they're asking for us to prove something other than that, which 
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1 we're not going to be able to because we don't agree with their 
2 interpretation of the law. 
3 THE COURT: Is there any issue at all regarding 
4 exhaustion of administrative remedies before you bring a petition 
5 in district court? 
6 MR. BODILY: Well, we've made no determination of their 
7 tax liability, your Honor. We're only asserting here an order of 
8 the Court for them to file their income tax returns, and--
9 THE COURT: Tax liability may follow after the filing of 
10 the returns, 
11 MR. BODILY: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: They may have after deductions no taxable 
13 income. 
14 MR. BODILY: Exactly. 
15 THE COURT: They may have a tax liability of thousands 
16 of dollars, but we don't know. 
17 MR. BODILY: I mean--
18 THE COURT: All you're asking from me is to have them 
19 file. 
20 MR. BODILY: Absolutely. 
21 THE COURT: All right. What about the issue -- and I'm 
22 clear on that, but what's your understanding of the issue about 
23 having them sign a perjured jurat? Do you have an understanding 
24 of what his position was on that (inaudible) to the--
25 MR. BODILY: Yes. He's required to prepare an income 
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THE COURT: D-6 is still in evidence, isn't it? I don't 
care what purpose you used it for. Once it's m evidence I can 
use any purpose I want. Prepare the orders, Mr. Bodily. 
MR. BODILY: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything more? 
MR. BODILY: I think (inaudible). 
THE COURT: We're in recess. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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PER CURIAM: 
H. Douglas and Lisa Goff appeal from a trial court writ of 
mandate requiring them to file state tax returns for specified 
years. This is before the court on the Tax Commission's 
(Commission) motion for summary disposition. 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 59-1-707, the Commission 
petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate compelling the 
Goffs to file state tax returns for several years. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-707 (2000) . After a hearing, the trial court granted 
the writ and ordered the Goffs to file required returns. The 
Goffs assert on appeal that the Commission failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies and failed to present evidence that the 
Goffs were required to file federal tax returns, and that 
documents showing the Goffs' income were inadmissable hearsay. 
The Goffs have not shown any requirement for the Commission 
to exhaust administrative remedies before exercising its 
statutorily provided remedy. Under the plain language of Utah 
Code section 59-1-707, the Commission is permitted to petition 
for mandate regardless of administrative proceedings. Section 
59-1-707 provides: "If a taxpayer fails to file any return 
required pursuant to Title 59 within 60 days of the time 
prescribed, the commission may petition for a writ of mandate to 
compel the taxpayer to file the return." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-
707(1) (a) (2000). Additionally, " [n]othing in this section shall 
limit the remedies otherwise available to the commission under 
Title 59 or other laws of this state." IcL_ § 59-1-707(2). The 
fact that the statute provides a specific court-based remedy 
supports that exhaustion is not required because the court remedy 
is not consistent with administrative process. Furthermore, the 
statute specifically notes that these judicial proceedings do not 
impact other administrative processes. 
Utah Code section 59-10-502 provides that a state income tax 
return "shall be filed by every resident individual . . . 
required to file a federal income tax return for the taxable 
year." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-502(1) (2000). The Goffs assert 
that the Commission failed to present evidence that they were 
required to file federal income tax returns, a prerequisite to 
the state return requirement. This assertion is refuted by the 
record. 
The Commission presented testimony that individuals 
receiving gross income above threshold amounts are required to 
file federal tax returns. The Goffs argue that the evidence was 
insufficient because at one point the Commission witness 
misstated the section number requiring the filing of returns. 
However, the correct section was identified in other testimony, 
and the substance of the requirement was presented, even if the 
number was in error. In addition, the correct section was 
presented in the Commission's memoranda supporting the writ. 
The requirement for an individual to file federal tax 
returns is based on gross income threshold determinations. Gross 
income is broadly defined as "all income from whatever source 
derived." -26 EL-S. CL it-61 (£fiQ_0}_. Individuals_with gross income 
greater than a threshold amount, generally the exemption amount 
plus the standard deduction, are required to file federal tax 
returns. See 26 U.S.C. § 6012 (2000) . The Commission presented 
testimony regarding this tax structure. The Goffs argue that the 
Commission did not show that the Goffs were engaged in taxable 
activities. Their argument is off point. The federal tax 
structure does not depend on "taxable activities." The 
determining factor of tax return obligations is income, not 
activity. The Goffs' implication that their activities did not 
come within the scope of the tax code is a mere distraction. The 
Goffs concede that individuals with gross income greater than a 
specified level are required to file federal tax returns. 
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The Goffs also challenge the documentary evidence admitted 
to establish that their income exceeded the threshold amount. 
The records were from the Commission, but were transmitted by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or the Division of Workforce 
Services (DWS) The sources of the information in the documents 
were employers or other entities even further removed from the 
IRS and DWS. Therefore, the Goffs argue the documents are 
inadmissible hearsay 
Although the Commission asserts that this evidentiary issue 
is also not worthy of additional review, the Goffs have presented 
a substantial issue warranting further court consideration. The 
Goffs have identified a legitimate issue and have provided case 
support for their position. This court would benefit from full 
briefing on the hearsay issue 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission's motion for summary 
disposition is granted in part and denied in part. The 
Commission was not required to exhaust administrative remedies 
prior to filing for a writ of mandate, and the Commission 
presented sufficient evidence regarding the federal tax structure 
and definitions to determine that the Goffs would be required to 
file federal tax returns if their income exceeded the threshold. 
The trial court's order is summarily affirmed as to these issues. 
Briefing shall move forward regarding the issue of whether 
the trial court properly admitted the Commission's exhibits P-l 
and P-5. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
Russell W Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
liilL^ 
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RE: TX CMMN v. Goff Appellate Case No. 20040867 
Dear Mr. Goff: 
The record index (#040911367) on this appeal was filed in this 
court. The record remains on file with the trial court for your 
use in preparing your brief. The purpose of this letter, 
therefore, is to set the briefing schedule. 
Pursuant to Rules 13 and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
the appellant's brief must be served and filed on or before 
February 18, 2005. This due date takes into consideration the 
three days mailing provision of Rule 22(d). 
Parties are advised to refer to Rules 24, 26 and 27, Utah R. App. 
P., for content and format requirements. These requirements are 
strictly enforced, and the brief may be returned pursuant to Rule 
27(d) if not properly prepared. 
All parties are specifically advised that the typeface 
requirements of Rule 27(b), Utah R. App. P., will be strictly 
enforced and noncomplying briefs will be rejected. A 
proportionally spaced typeface must be 13-point or larger for 
text and footnotes. A monospaced typeface may not contain more 
than ten characters per inch for both text and footnotes. 
Motions for additional time to file briefs must comply with the 
requirements of Rules 22(b) or 26(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Please note that all extension requests, 
other than the first one requested by each party, that are not 
stipulated to by the opposing party, will not be acted upon until 
the time for response has expired. 
Parties may request oral argument and/or published decision by so 
indicating at the bottom on the cover of their brief. The court 
will not formally respond to such requests, but will consider the 
same during its regular calendaring process. 
This court is interested in evaluating the usefulness of 
receiving briefs in electronic form. To assist in this 
evaluation, you are encouraged to submit a CD which contains the 
electronic version of your^brief„at the same time you file the 
required number of written briefs. The electronic version of the 
brief must be in Word or WordPerfect format. Your participation 
in this study will be appreciated. 
Failure to perfect an appeal at any time during the appeal 
process may result in dismissal of the appeal. 
Sincerely, 
Maren Larson 
Deputy Clerk 
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